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Abstract 
 
Economic growth in Africa has long been disappointing.  We document that the financial 
sectors of most sub-Saharan African countries remain significantly underdeveloped by the standards 
of other developing countries.  We examine the factors that are associated with financial 
development in Africa and compare them with those in other developing countries.  Population 
density appears to be considerably more important for banking sector development in Africa than 
elsewhere.  Given the high costs of developing viable banking sectors outside metropolitan areas, 
technology advances, such as mobile banking, could be a promising way to facilitate African 
financial development.  Similarly to other developing countries, natural resources endowment is 
associated with a lower level of financial development in Africa, but macro policies do not appear 
to be an important determinant. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 Africa’s growth performance has long been disappointing and it has been described as a 
tragedy by some commentators (e.g., Easterly and Levine, 1997).  Although less well-documented 
and perhaps not surprising, the financial sectors of sub-Saharan African countries remain woefully 
under-developed, even relative to the standards of developing countries.  This is despite the fact that 
most of these countries have undergone extensive financial sector reforms in the last two decades of 
the same proportions as other developing and emerging countries.1     
The failure of the economic and financial sector reforms in sub-Saharan Africa is visible in 
the data. For example, the population-weighted trends for developing regions in GDP in terms of 
liquid liabilities and private credit show that the rest of the developing world has seen substantial 
improvement relative to Africa in the last two decades, though the patterns differ across regions.  
Countries that started with similar or lower income levels in the Middle East, North Africa, and 
Asia have seen substantial improvement in both financial development and income.  By contrast, 
the liquid liabilities of African financial sectors averaged slightly below 30 percent of GDP in 2007.  
In no other region of the developing world did that figure stand below 40 percent (Table 1).  The 
credit side of the picture looks even worse.  Africa’s average level of credit extended to the private 
sector represented only 16.6 percent of GDP in 2007 compared with ratios ranging from 32.5 to 
43.9 percent for other developing regions (Table 2). These data show that the financial development 
indicators of Africa have improved in the period 1995-2005, but at a much slower pace than in other 
developing and emerging countries in Asia and Latin America.   
 These disappointing results and, more generally, the poor state of African financial 
development raise a number of important questions on what went wrong with the financial reforms 
                                                 
1 The reform packages included price and interest rate liberalization, removal of credit ceilings, introduction of a variety 
of measures for banking and capital market development, including financial regulatory schemes, and large scale 
privatizations of state-owned enterprises (see, for instance, Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998;  Senbet and Otchere, 2006; 
and Honohan and Beck, 2007).   
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in Africa and on what could be improved.  Is African financial development slow in itself, or is it 
merely a reflection of broader economic and policy failures?  Are the levels of financial 
development achieved outside of Africa, in both developed and developing countries, achievable for 
most African countries?  What factors have inhibited African financial development to this point?  
If those factors were corrected and financial development did take hold, would the finance-growth 
nexus hold in Africa as seen in other places? Understanding these issues is of crucial importance 
since, as well documented in the ample empirical evidence, there is a convincing linkage between 
financial development and economic development.2  Moreover, in the context of Africa where 
poverty is so widespread, the positive relationship between financial development and economic 
development is suggestive of a positive linkage between finance and poverty alleviation.  
 There is virtually no rigorous academic research that addresses these questions.  This paper 
represents a first step in addressing key issues at the heart of African financial development.  Our 
aim is to assess whether African financial development is slower than it ought to be, and if so why.  
To do this, we first analyze the determinants of financial development in other developing countries 
(low- and middle-income countries) via regression models based on prior research.  We use the 
regression coefficients to generate predicted levels of financial development, as measured by the 
ratios of liquid liabilities and private credit over GDP, for sub-Saharan African countries (excluding 
South Africa). Then we compare those predicted levels with the actual levels of financial 
development in the African countries.  We find that most African countries tend to have lower 
levels of financial development than would be predicted based on their fundamentals.  The average 
country falls 13 percentage points short of its predicted level for liquid liabilities over GDP and 12 
percentage points for private credit over GDP. 
To understand why this is the case, we examine in a second step whether the factors that 
                                                 
2  See, for example, Levine (2005), Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000), and Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
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drive financial development in Africa are the same as in other developing countries.  We run 
regressions for other developed countries and African countries separately.  We also examine the 
combined sample with an African dummy, and interact the African dummy with factors affecting 
financial sector development.  One of our main findings is that population density appears to be 
more important for banking sector development as measured by liquid liabilities and private credit 
(relative to GDP) in Africa than in other developing countries.  If frequent interactions among firms, 
households, and investors are a necessary condition for business transactions and therefore financial 
development, then our results are plausible in that many African countries are endowed with 
scattered population and roads.  Furthermore, we find a nonlinear relationship between population 
density and banking sector development, and the largest gap between Africa and the rest of the 
developing world is for those African countries ‘trapped’ in the low density area.  This suggests that 
the minimum, viable banking scale in Africa is perhaps greater than elsewhere.  
We further explore the channels through which population density may affect banking sector 
development by examining additional variables related to population density.  We find that the 
percentage of population living in the largest cities, roads per square kilometer and bank branch 
penetration are all associated with more banking sector development, but the results are weaker for 
the scale of private (bank) credit.  These results imply that the minimum viable banking sector scale 
is best achieved in major cities, and that technology advances such as mobile banking could be a 
promising way to facilitate African financial development, especially on the savings side of the 
banking sector outside metropolitan areas.  
Concerning other factors explaining banking sector development, we find that 
macroeconomic stability and broad measures of institutional quality are less important in Africa 
than in other developing countries, while the natural resource ‘curse’ (e.g., Sachs and Warner, 1995, 
2001) is no worse in Africa than elsewhere.  Finally, regarding the indicators of stock market 
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development, such as market capitalization and turnover, we do not find any of the factors 
associated with stock market development in the rest of the world to be significant in Africa.  In 
large part, this is due to the fact that most African stock markets remain thin, illiquid and 
dysfunctional; and only very recently Sub-Saharan African countries have made a policy 
commitment to their development.   
Given the criticisms of cross-country studies, and in particular, that the results are possibly 
due to measurement errors and/or unobservable country-level factors, we also conduct firm-level 
analyses.  Employing the widely used World Bank global Investment Climate Surveys (ICS) with 
most of the surveyed firms unlisted, we examine factors determining firms’ access to external 
finance in the form of bank loans (from both domestic and foreign banks) and/or credit cards.  This 
is consistent with prior research showing that financial institutions provide the most important 
source of external finance in most developing countries (e.g., Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 
2000).  The idea is that if a country’s banking sector is more developed, firms, and in particular 
privately owned firms, should have an easier access to these types of formal finance.  We run 
regression models where we include the same country-level factors as in our cross-country studies 
as well as firm characteristics (e.g., age, size, industry, exporter and foreign ownership status) that 
could explain substantial variations in the demand for and in the use of financial services.  Once 
again, we include the African dummy and interact it with both country- and firm-level variables.   
The results of the micro-level regressions confirm that population density is an important 
factor for access of firms to financial institutions.  While bank branch penetration is an important 
factor for access to bank finance, the coverage of roads is not as important for African firms as their 
counterparts elsewhere.  As with country-level studies, general infrastructural failures are not 
necessarily responsible for low levels of firm access to bank finance in Africa, but rather failures are 
specific to the banking sector and markets for loans.  While manufacturers are more likely to access 
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bank finance in other countries, they show no strong tendency to rely on external finance relative to 
other firms in Africa.   
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the data, methodology for 
benchmarking financial development across countries, and the summary statistics.  Section III 
examines whether the actual financial sector development in Africa is below what the fundamentals 
would predict using other developing countries as benchmarks.  Then Section IV examines whether 
the variables associated with banking development in other developing countries from our base 
models are related in a similar way to African banking development.  Section V present results on 
the determinants of firm access to external finance in Africa and other developing countries.  
Section VI offers concluding remarks. 
 
II. Benchmarking Financial Development: Data and Methodology 
The stylized facts, such as those in Tables 1 and 2, permit comparisons across countries in 
terms of their levels of financial development.  Such comparisons can be revealing, especially when 
looking at a set of peers that are at a similar level of economic development.  Yet, the selection of 
such peer groups is somewhat ad hoc and limits the degree to which a country can be compared to a 
broader set of countries.  Moreover, comparing levels of financial development yields little insight 
into the factors (endowments, institutions, and policies) that led to those outcomes.  For that, the 
literature has turned increasingly to regression analysis to examine the level and variation of 
financial development across countries relying on some of the same variables that have been used to 
study the links between financial development and growth (Levine, 2005).3 
                                                 
3 As in other recent papers, we use these variables, including growth, to describe financial development (Cull and 
Effron, 2008; Cull, Senbet, and Sorge, 2005). By contrast, in the finance and growth literature, the financial indicators 
are among the explanatory variables used to explain growth. 
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There is no general consensus in the literature about the factors that should be taken into 
account in explaining financial development, nor what indicators of that development are most 
reliable.  In the choice of the latter, we ground our analyses on the recent attempt by Beck et al. 
(2008) to standardize the selection of financial development indicators.  Under this approach, the 
potential financial development indicators are ranked on the basis of the following criteria:  (a) the 
directness of their linkages to welfare, (b) the goodness of fit of regressions that explain variations 
in them, (c) their coverage in terms of countries and years, and, (d) the degree to which an indicator 
is stable within a country from year to year, but varies substantially across countries.4   
In most of our analysis we use the two standard indicators presented in Tables 1 and 2, 
namely the ratio of liquid liabilities in the banking system to GDP and the ratio of credit to private 
sector to GDP.  Both measures score among the highest based on the all four criteria listed above.  
They score especially high relative to others on the first criterion, because they are robustly 
associated with long-run economic growth (Levine 2005; Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000).  
Moreover, our analysis is rooted in banking indicators because banks hold the vast majority of 
financial sector assets in Africa and other developing countries.5  Despite this, we perform 
robustness checks using measures of stock market development as indicators of financial 
development.  
In the choice of the explanatory variables for financial development, we first rely again on 
previous studies in particular those on the finance-growth nexus (e.g., Levine, 2005) and on 
government policies that promote financial development (e.g., Beck et. al, 2008).  These studies (in 
                                                 
4 Beck et al. (2008) call this the ratio of within sample variance to between sample variance. They worry that high 
within-country variation may reflect measurement errors or a high degree of co-movement with the business cycle. 
They argue that indicators of financial development are (or at least should be) better suited to measuring longer-term 
differences across countries rather than fluctuations along the cycle for a given country. 
5 The ratio of private credit to GDP can include lending by nonbank financial institutions. As Table 4 shows, though, the 
correlations between private credit/GDP and stock market capitalization, and those between liquid liabilities/GDP and 
stock market capitalization/GDP are of similar magnitude (0.65 and 0.68), respectively.  In our robustness checks, we 
introduce indicators of stock market development, but they have limited impact because of the thinness of African stock 
markets and their infancy. 
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particular, Beck et al. 2008) regress the indicators of financial development on a set of variables 
that describe the environment in which such development takes place, but that are exogenous to that 
process such as population size and density, natural resources and offshore centers. They also 
include per capita income as an exogenous regressor, claiming that its effect on financial 
development is contemporaneous while the effect of financial development on income is lagged. 
The residuals from those regressions, therefore, provide an indication of the extent to which the 
chosen government policies promote financial development.  
However, as our objective is to benchmark African financial development relative to a set of 
variables that have been robustly associated with financial development in countries outside of 
Africa, especially in low and middle income countries, we expand further the set of regressors by 
including macroeconomic variables, such as inflation, real growth, and the current account balance, 
broad measures of institutional development, and variables describing banking sector structure and 
ownership.  We stress from the outset that we are not necessarily estimating causal relationships for 
the expanded set of regressors.  For ease of exposition, however, we refer to all explanatory 
variables as determinants of financial development throughout the paper. 
  The regression for the expanded set of explanatory variables is then: 
(1) FDi = α + β1Populationi Exogenous determinants, based on Beck et al.  
                + β2Population Densityi (2008) 
                + β3Natural Resourcesi  
                +β4Offshore Centeri  
                +β5Per Capita Incomei Plausibly exogenous, Financial development  
                +β6Population*GDP Per Capitai affects these variables at a lag, Beck et al. (2008) 
                +β7Real GDP Growth Ratei Macroeconomic variables 
                +β8Inflation Ratei  
                +β9Current Account Balance/GDPi  
                +Β10KKM Indexi Index of institutional development 
                + β11Bank Concentration  Banking sector structure and ownership variables 
                +Β12Foreign Ownership Sharei  
                +Β13State Ownership Sharei  
                +Β14Manufacturing/GDPi Other variables 
                +Β15Secondary/Primary enrolment  
                + εi  
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We briefly explain our variables below: 
Financial Development indicator (FDi): This measures an indicator of financial 
development in country i. We average our indicators of financial development and our explanatory 
variables over multiple years (from 2001 to 2005), as is customary in the literature on financial 
development and growth so as to reduce the influence of outliers. We therefore have only one 
observation per country. The results are qualitatively similar when we use all yearly observations 
from 1990 to 2006 in panel regressions, and when we lag the explanatory variables in either the 
panel regressions or the cross-sectional regressions.6  Because our goal is to describe a general 
picture of the factors that are robustly linked to financial development, however, we present below 
only the simplest cross-country regressions in which the financial indicators and explanatory 
variables are contemporaneous. 
Population: We measure population both with size and density and we expect both variables 
to be positively associated with financial development. A larger size of population should spur 
financial development due to scale and networking effects that make provision of financial services 
more efficient in larger economies. Density, as measured by the number of residents per square 
kilometre, should have a positive coefficient because it is easier for financial institutions to 
accumulate savings when a higher number of potential depositors have easy access to them.  
Natural Resources: An abundance of natural resources may have a negative effect on 
financial development via the so-called “resource curse.” Consistent with this, Sachs and Warner 
(1995, 2001) offer evidence that resource-rich developing countries have grown more slowly since 
1960 than other developing countries.  
We measure the intensity of a country’s reliance on natural resources by using a 
                                                 
6 For example, in the cross-sectional regression we average the explanatory variables from 1990 to 2000 and use them 
to explain financial development indicators averaged from 2001 to 2005.  In the panel regression, we lag the 
explanatory variables by one to three years. 
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comprehensive approach that measures resource abundance based on trade indicators rather than 
solely on oil exports:: 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧∈=∑ materials rawcereal,animal,  tropical,forest, petroleum,  where,64-15 ages Population Imports-Exportsresources Natural kk kk  
The key advantage of this approach is that this measure of net exports is available for most 
countries and, as shown by Lederman and Maloney (2008), it is more closely linked to actual 
natural resource reserves than other trade-based endowment measures. If there is a resource curse 
and it impacts financial development, we would expect the coefficient on this variable to be 
negative. 
Offshore Centers: The financial sectors of offshore centers are typically much larger than 
their economies would otherwise warrant.  We measure this effect with a dummy variable for 
offshore financial centers and we expect it to be positive.7 
Per Capita Income: Per capita income is expected to be positively linked to financial 
development, because the volume and the sophistication of financial activities demanded is greater 
in richer countries and, on the supply side, richer economies can better exploit scale economies in 
the provision of financial services.  Per capita income reflects an aggregation of past growth, and 
hence its coefficient summarizes the long-run positive relationship between growth and financial 
development.  Moreover, per capital income may interact with population, and we capture this 
effect by including an interaction variable.  
Indicators of Macroeconomic Stability: Financial development is more likely in a sound 
macroeconomic environment and to measure this, we include real growth, inflation and the current 
account balance (relative to GDP) in the regressions.  
(a) Real growth: The effect of real growth on financial development is ambiguous. On the 
                                                 
7 One could question whether this is an exogenous variable.  We follow Beck et al. (2008) in taking it as exogenous. 
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one hand, countries with rapid growth may be associated with greater financial development.  On 
the other hand, countries with higher levels of development, as reflected in GDP per capita, tend to 
have slower growth according to ‘conditional convergence’ (Levine and Renelt, 1992; Easterly and 
Levine, 1997).  Given that financial development indicators tend to be highly correlated with per 
capita income, it is likely that the faster growing countries will have lower levels of financial 
development.  We would therefore expect a negative coefficient for real growth in our financial 
development regressions.  The coefficient should also capture the negative short-run relationship 
between financial development and growth as emphasized in Loayza and Ranciere (2006). 
(b) Inflation:  On the private credit side, inflation should slow financial development if it 
makes loan contracting over extended periods more difficult.  Inflation could also have a dampening 
effect on liquid liabilities, making depositors more hesitant to place their savings in the formal 
financial system for fear of not being able to get them back quickly enough.  Therefore, we expect 
the coefficient for inflation to be negative in our regressions.  
(c) Current Account Balance: The current account balance can be seen as a rough indicator 
of the health of the macroeconomic environment, and we thus expect it to be positively associated 
with our financial indicators. 
Institutional Development: We include in the regression KKM, which is the measure of 
broad institutional development created by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Maztruzzi (2007).  Institutional 
development has been found to foster financial development in developing countries (Cull and 
Effron, 2008), and thus we expect a positive coefficient for KKM in our regressions. 
Banking Sector Concentration: To control for the structure of the banking sector, we include 
a measure of banking sector concentration as represented by the share of assets held by the three 
largest banks in a country. We have no strong prediction about the sign of its coefficient.  On the 
one hand, large dominant banks may foster financial development as they may be better able to 
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exploit economies of scope and scale and thus provide more services than smaller banks.  On the 
other hand, large banks may have a negative impact on financial development as they may use their 
market power to raise the price of financial services (or lower the interest rate offered for deposits), 
thus curtailing outreach and the volume of services that they provide.  
Bank Ownership: We measure the impact of bank ownership by including two different 
variables, the share of banking sector assets held by state-owned and by foreign-owned banks.  
(a) State ownership: There is a substantial empirical literature demonstrating that state 
ownership of banks has negative effects on financial sector outcomes also in terms of real growth 
and productivity (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2002), and bank portfolio quality and 
profitability (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2001a, b; 2004).8  We would therefore expect a negative 
coefficient for the share of banking sector assets held by state owned banks in our regressions.  
(b) Foreign ownership: Predictions about the foreign bank ownership variable are less clear.  
On the one hand, foreign banks tend to have lower overhead costs, charge lower spreads, and help 
promote bank competition by pressuring other banks to lower their costs and their spreads in 
developing countries (Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001; Claessens and Lee, 2003; 
Claessens and Laeven, 2003; and Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004).  On the other hand, foreign 
banks may extend services to fewer customers, either due to prudence or ‘cherry-picking’ a small 
group of wealthy clients (Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta, 2006). 
Manufacturing: We include the share of GDP generated by the manufacturing sector. 
Industrial sectors that are relatively more in need of finance tend to grow faster in countries with 
well-developed financial sectors (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).  Manufacturing encompasses a broad 
variety of activities that tend to rely heavily on external finance so that we expect countries with a 
                                                 
8 Using bank-level data from over 1,600 banks in 100 emerging economies, Mian (forthcoming) confirms that state-
owned banks are significantly less profitable and have higher loan default rates than private banks, despite the fact that 
their deposit costs are substantially lower than private banks. 
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large manufacturing sector to have well-developed complementary financial institutions.  We 
therefore expect a positive coefficient for manufacturing in our regressions.  
Secondary/Primary enrollment: Finally, we want to measure the impact of risk management 
on financial development.  The idea is that a lack of capacity in risk management may be a deterrent 
to banking sector development and broader financial sector development (e.g., stock markets).  As 
measuring financial capabilities across countries directly is not possible, we proxy risk management 
capability with the ratio of secondary to primary school enrolment and we expect its coefficient to 
be positive.  Our argument is that risk management capability is fundamentally a question of human 
capital development and thus of talented financial people. 
The summary statistics and the correlations between the key variables appear in Tables 3 
and 4.  Table 3 shows that the mean values for the financial indicators are uniformly lower in Africa 
than the rest of the world, measured in terms of liquid liabilities, private credit provision, and stock 
market development.  We also see marked differences in the explanatory variables between Africa 
and the rest of the world, particularly with respect to population density, per capita income, current 
account balance/GDP and institutional development as proxied by the KKM index. 
  The correlations in Table 4 are instructive.  All indicators of financial development  -liquid 
liabilities/GDP, private credit/GDP, stock market capitalization/GDP, and stock market value 
traded/GDP-  are highly correlated; and population density is positively associated with two of 
them, liquid liabilities/GDP and stock market capitalization/GDP.  The macro economic variables 
are strongly associated with the measures of financial development in an expected way.  In 
particular, there is a negative relationship between the financial development indicators and both 
inflation and real growth, and a positive relationship between the indicators and the current account 
balance.  However, the relationship with real growth is weaker than the other macro variables.  The 
KKM index of institutional development is strongly and positively associated with all of the 
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indicators of financial development.  The same holds for the log of per capita income.  This is 
indicative that there is a long-run relationship between finance and growth.  Finally, the 
secondary/primary school enrollment is positively associated with the measures of financial 
development.  This proxy is intended to capture the need for increasing talent as the financial 
system develops. 
 
III. Empirical Results at Country Level: The African Financial Development Gap  
What is the positioning of Africa in the financial development path?  To measure this, we 
estimate the regression Equation (1) specified above for countries outside Africa so as to predict 
what African financial development should be based on the experience of these other countries.  
Specifically, we first run the regressions excluding all African countries, and we derive out-of-
sample predictions for African financial development.  Then we compare these predictions with the 
actual levels of African financial development to measure the development gap.9  We present 
models for all countries and for low and middle income countries separately.  The latter are more 
reflective of the African experience.  
 
A.  Benchmarking Results for the Determinants of Financial Development 
The results for the estimation of the regression Equation (1) are presented in Table 5.  The 
signs of almost all of the coefficients are as predicted and many of them are significant.  When we 
use the full sample of countries and the limited set of regressors as a benchmark, (see Columns 1 
and 5), only the Per Capita Income Variable is positively associated with both indicators of banking 
development, while our proxy for Natural Resource intensity is negatively linked to those 
indicators.  Population Density and Offshore Financial Center are significantly positive in the liquid 
                                                 
9 The same approach has been used, for example, to assess whether the levels of foreign direct investment received by 
China are abnormally high, or whether they can be explained by fundamentals (Fan, Morck, Xu, and Yeung, 2008). 
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liabilities regression (Column 1) but not the private credit regression (Column 5).  When we 
benchmark to a sample of only low and middle income countries, using the limited set of regressors  
(Columns 3 and 7), the Offshore Financial Center is highly significant for both indicators, while the 
Per Capita Income and Population Density variables are positive and significant, but only in the 
private credit regression.10 
The expanded regression results, where we include macroeconomic, institutional, banking 
structure, and other explanatory variables, are presented in Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8.  The results show 
that Real Growth is negative and significant (or very nearly so) for both private credit and liquid 
liabilities for both samples of countries that we use.  This indicates that the fastest growing 
countries tend to have the least-developed financial sectors, providing support for conditional 
convergence.  As discussed earlier, this is just a reflection of a short-run relationship between 
financial development and growth.  Inflation is negative and highly significant across financial 
indicators and country samples.  The coefficients are similar in size for the full set of countries and 
for the low and middle income countries, indicating that macroeconomic instability is strongly 
linked to financial under-development even in developing countries.  The Current Account 
Balance/GDP is strongly positively linked to both indicators for both samples, though coefficients 
are larger for the low and middle income sample.  In short, the coefficients support our hypotheses 
and indicate strong links between macroeconomic outcomes and financial development. 
                                                 
10 These results are similar to those in Beck et al., (2008). Aside from our proxy for natural resource intensity, our 
regressions differ from theirs in two ways. First, we use the more conservative cross-sectional approach, whereas they 
use the full panel. We choose to do this because errors from observations from the same country are likely to be 
correlated with one another. This could artificially deflate standard errors, thus increasing the significance level of 
coefficients. For robustness, we ran our models also on the full panel and qualitative results are similar. Second, they 
include a version of the poverty gap in their regressions, which is the proportion of the population under the poverty 
line, times the average distance from the poverty line (Source: Povcal Net, World Bank). Since the poverty gap is so 
tightly linked to income levels, they use the residuals from a regression of the gap on income in their regressions. We 
did the same, but the variable provided little explanatory power and reduced our sample. Also, unlike the other variables 
in our analysis, the poverty counts are based on surveys that do not occur at regular intervals, and thus the panel is 
highly unbalanced. For these reasons, we present models without the poverty gap variable. 
 15
Our proxy for the degree of institutional development, as represented by the KKM index, is 
positive and highly significant across financial indicators and samples, providing support for the 
notion that broad institutional development helps to foster financial development.  The coefficients 
are larger for the full-country sample than for the sample of low and middle income countries, but 
they are still large even in the latter case: a one-point increase in the KKM index (5-point scale) is 
associated with a 23 percentage point increase in liquid liabilities/GDP and a 26 percentage point 
increase for the private credit ratio. 
Among the rest of the variables in the expanded regressions, only the Foreign Ownership 
Share variables is negatively and almost always robustly associated with both our indicators of 
banking development, and the link is especially strong in low and middle income countries.  At first 
blush, this result would appear to support the notion that foreign banks tend to cherry-pick a set of 
elite customers and shun the rural sector in favor of the urban sector.  However, it is well known 
that governments and banking supervisors were looking for foreign investors to re-capitalize failed 
banks during this period.  It seems likely, therefore, that much of the increased foreign bank 
presence occurred in countries with weaker banking systems.  Supporting evidence of this can be 
found in Cull and Martinez Peria (2008), who find that crisis-induced foreign entry was associated 
with reduced provision of credit to the private sector, whereas countries with reasonably high and 
stable levels of foreign bank presence tended to have higher private credit levels before, during, and 
after crises.  As we show below, the foreign ownership variable is not significant for Africa, where 
systemic crises involving large runs by depositors have been much less frequent than in other parts 
of the developing world. 
 The other variable of bank ownership, State Ownership Share, is positively associated with 
the liquid liabilities to GDP ratio, but not with the private credit ratio, though the result is not 
significant for either indicator of banking development.  The result on the private credit ratio is 
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consistent with the argument that large state ownership of banks makes it possible for the public 
sector to crowd out the private sector in the credit market and to lower development.  The result on 
the liquid liabilities is instead somewhat more counterintuitive.  One possible explanation is that the 
liquid liability measure is more reflective of excessive liquidity in the state-owned banks.  Viewed 
that way, the liquidity measure becomes a perverse indicator of financial development in a state 
dominated banking system.  
Finally, in the expanded models, natural resource intensity remains negatively related to 
banking sector development for both indicators, and in particular in the low and middle income 
sample.  Similarly, the offshore financial center variable is significant for both indicators for low 
and middle income countries.  Neither per capita income nor the population density variables 
remain positive and significant when we use the expanded set of regressors. 
To summarize, the factors that are robustly associated with financial development in 
developing countries outside of Africa are real natural resource intensity, the offshore financial 
center dummy, real GDP growth, inflation, the current account balance, broad institutional 
development, the share of banking sector assets held by foreign banks.  These results are used as a 
benchmark in understanding the financial development gap in Africa. 
 
B.  Predicted Versus Actual African Financial Development  
We now use the regression coefficients in Table 5 to derive a predicted level of financial 
development for each country in Africa.  Because they are likely to be more reflective of the 
African experience, as our benchmark we rely on the models that include only low and middle 
income countries.11  Again, we are not claiming that the relationships we find in Table 5 are causal.  
Rather, we are asking what the level of financial development would be if the same relationships 
                                                 
11 We also tried to estimate models based only on low income countries outside of Africa, but there were too few 
observations to generate meaningful results. 
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held in Africa as in the rest of the developing world.  To the extent that predicted and actual levels 
of financial development are similar, one can say that African financial development is about what 
it should be.  We suppress the bank ownership variables in deriving the predictions because they are 
large (in absolute value) and are likely to be driven by selection effects in the case of foreign 
ownership for the reasons described above.  Also, as described below, they are not reflective of the 
African experience.  Including the foreign ownership variable drags predicted levels down near 
actual levels.  It seems farfetched to us, however, to believe that the presence of foreign banks can 
explain the sizable differences between predicted and actual levels of banking sector development 
that we summarize in this section.   
1.  African financial development gap: Liquid liabilities. Figure 1 shows that only seven of 
thirty-one countries have levels of liquid liabilities/GDP which are at or above their predicted 
levels.  Of those, three (Angola, Sierra Leone, and Zambia) are huddled in the lower left hand 
corner of the figure where actual and predicted values are very low.  Because the predicted values 
are based on linear regressions, they tend to be very near zero for these countries.12  That their 
actual levels exceed zero by some small amount is little consolation.  To a lesser extent the same is 
true of Mozambique.  Ethiopia has predicted and actual levels of liquid liabilities that are quite 
similar.  The result on Ethiopia seems surprising given the country is known to have embarked on 
very low levels of financial sector reforms and has a banking system dominated by the government.  
State-owned banks collect deposits but they do not intermediate (lend) well.  In fact, the dominant 
bank in Ethiopia is known to have a high accumulation of liquidity and idle funds in line with the 
results above that the liquidity measure in the case of state-owned banks is just a perverse measure 
of financial development.  There are only two countries, namely Cape Verde and Mauritius – 
                                                 
12 Indeed, for Angola the predicted value is negative (and large in absolute value). This is due to its high average GDP 
growth (10.6%), low KKM score (-.71), and high inflation (86.4% per year). Negative levels of financial development 
are not, however, possible. For countries that have negative predicted values, we reset them to zero in both the figures. 
The calculations are discussed in the text. 
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among the smallest in Africa – that exceed their predicted levels by a substantial amount, but 
neither of the two is particularly reflective of the African experience.  
As Figure 1 shows, twenty countries have levels of liquid liabilities that are more than ten 
percentage points below their predicted levels.  The worse ten performers for example range 
between 24 and 47 percentage points below.  The average country falls 13 percentage points short 
of its predicted level, which is quite sizable, given that the average ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP 
hovered between 26.5 and 30.9% from 2001 to 2005. 
2. African financial development gap: Private Credit: As shown in Figure 2, the level of private 
credit/GDP for African countries lies far below predicted levels.  Again, only seven countries 
exceed their predicted levels and only Mauritius does so by more than ten percentage points.  Of the 
twenty-four countries with predicted levels that are higher than their actual private credit ratios, 
seventeen fall short by more than ten percentage points.  The ten poorest performers range from 22 
to 34 percentage points below their predicted levels, and the average country falls short of its 
predicted level by 12 points.  The magnitude of this measure of under-performance is quite large 
when one considers that the average ratio of private credit to GDP stood at 15.5% in 2005. 
The gap in the observed African financial development, relative to what is predicted by the 
benchmark determinants, is stark.  The levels of liquid liabilities to GDP for African countries are 
about two-thirds the level predicted by statistical relationships that hold elsewhere in the developing 
world.  Private credit ratios are even lower, slightly better than half their predicted levels.  There is 
also general consistency in rankings across the two indicators.  Of the bottom ten performers in 
terms of liquid liabilities, seven are also among the bottom performers in terms of private credit, 
and the correlation for the differences between predicted and actual levels for the measures of 
financial development is 0.85.  Our results point to systematic under-performance relative to the 
fundamentals that have been associated with banking sector development in the rest of the world.  
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To analyze this gap more in depth, in the next sections we look at whether the factors in our base 
models relate to African financial development differently than to financial development in the rest 
of the world. 
IV. Are the Determinants of African Financial Development Different? 
So far we have defined under-development in African financial sectors in terms of the 
determinants of financial sector development in other parts of the developing world.  However, the 
course of African financial sector development might depend on a different set of factors than those 
that have been important elsewhere.13  While we are reluctant to accept that African financial 
sectors have a distinct model of development, it seems plausible that some factors may be 
somewhat more or less important in the African context.  
To see whether this is indeed the case, as a first step, we estimate the model in Table 6 for 
the sample of African countries.  Note that this method essentially accepts that the level of financial 
development in Africa is lower than that in the rest of the developing world, and then tries to 
explain variation around the African mean based on the explanatory variables in our base models. 
Still, the results are instructive.14   
First, population density is much more strongly linked to both liquid liabilities/GDP and 
private credit/GDP than it was elsewhere in the world.  In fact, among the set of exogenous factors 
in the regression equation (1), population density is the only one that is robustly linked to our 
indicators of banking development.  Moreover, the interaction between population and per capita 
income is positive and significant in two of the private credit regressions, although not when South 
Africa is dropped from the African sample.  This is reasonable, given the relatively high level of 
economic development of this country.  Second, among the factors that explain financial 
                                                 
13  It may also be that the factors explaining financial development in Africa are the same as for the other countries but 
these factors load up or contribute differently in the African context. We are open to either interpretation.     
14 Note that the offshore financial center variable does not appear in the models in Table 6 because no African countries 
qualify. 
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development in the rest of the developing world, only the KKM index of institutional development 
seems relevant for Africa but only for the liquid liabilities measure.  
 The other additional factors in the expanded regressions in Table 6 are less important in 
Africa than elsewhere.  Real growth is not significant.  We argued earlier that the negative, 
significant coefficient for growth in the rest of the developing world was consistent with conditional 
convergence, because it indicated that the least financially developed countries had higher growth 
rates.  The non-result for Africa suggests that such convergence did not occur there, a point which 
was also made for some African countries in Pritchett (1997).  In addition, neither inflation nor the 
current account balance is significant in the African regressions, whereas both were highly 
significant in the rest of the world as shown in Table 5.  The poor results for inflation, the current 
account, and growth indicate that the macroeconomic fundamentals that are associated with 
financial development in other developing countries are not important in Africa.15   
 
A.  A Closer Look at Differences in Financial Development Factors 
The models in Table 6 provide a strong initial indication that the factors associated with 
banking development in Africa differ from those in the rest of the world.  However, those African 
models are based on only a small number of observations.  Moreover, when we include the bank 
ownership variables in the regressions, our sample drops to only 25 observations, and we cannot 
derive meaningful results (thus those models do not appear in Table 6).  
To address the small sample issue we re-run our models for all low and middle income 
countries (including Africa) and include an interaction between each of our explanatory variables 
                                                 
15 The results on macroeconomic fundamentals suggest that African countries were able to avoid the financial roller-
coaster ride associated with macroeconomic instability that other countries experienced during this period. However, 
this apparent benefit might have come at a substantial opportunity cost associated with the same low levels of financial 
development during this period.  To some extent, therefore, our base regressions give credit to some African countries 
for having relatively low initial levels of development, stable prices, and a current account surplus. These factors 
contribute to higher predicted financial development than has actually occurred.  
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and an Africa dummy variable.  We also include an Africa dummy variable on its own to test 
whether the constant for Africa in our regressions is the same as in the rest of the developing world. 
This is akin to a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), but the coefficients on the interactions 
terms enable us to make more precise statements about whether the effects for Africa are 
statistically different than for the rest of the developing world and from zero (i.e., there is no effect).  
The results are presented in Table 7.  In the simplest regressions, we include only the Africa 
dummy and the limited set of regressors (Columns 1 and 5).  The Africa dummy is negative for both 
indicators but it is significant only in the liquid liabilities regression.  Per capita income is positive 
and significant for both indicators; and it remains positive when the Africa interactions are 
introduced (Columns 2 and 6), although it then becomes insignificant in the liquid liabilities 
regression.  Moreover, per capita income is mostly not significant when we introduce the African 
interaction terms for the expanded set of regressors (Columns 3, 4, and 8).  The offshore financial 
center variable is positive and significant across all specifications in Table 7, though again no 
African country qualifies as an offshore center and so there is no Africa interaction for the variable. 
The most relevant explanatory variable for Africa is again population density. When only 
the limited set of regressors is included in the regression, population density is positive and highly 
significant for both indicators of financial development (Columns 1 and 5).  When the Africa 
dummy is interacted with the limited set of regressors (Columns 2 and 6), the relationship is still 
positive but weaker in terms of significance.  When interactions are included for the expanded set of 
regressors (Columns 3, 4, 7, and 8), the variable is no longer positive and significant.  However, the 
interaction between population density and the Africa dummy is significant for both of our 
indicators of banking development when the bank ownership variables are excluded from the 
regressions (Columns 3 and 7).  We also reject that the sum of the coefficients for density and its 
interaction with the Africa dummy is zero at the p = 0.05 level for those models (see F-statistics 
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near the bottom of Table 7).  In other words, the relationship between population density and our 
banking development indicators for African countries is significantly different from zero.  
When the bank ownership variables are introduced (Columns 4 and 8), the coefficient for 
Africa*population density is positive and remains similar in size for both indicators, but does not 
quite achieve significance, and we cannot reject that the sum of density and its Africa interaction is 
zero.  This is not too much of a concern, however, as foreign banks do not enter markets randomly 
and are, in fact, attracted to densely populated areas. The correlation between foreign ownership and 
density is 0.43 which is significant at the p = 0.01 level.  It is no surprise, therefore, that those 
variables compete for explanatory power in the regression.  The density of population clearly 
preceded and led to the presence of foreign-owned banks, and not the other way around.  Therefore, 
we can safely interpret our regressions in Table 7 as implying that there is a strong relationship 
between population density and banking indicators for Africa, but not for the rest of the world. 
In contrast, the relationship between natural resource intensity and banking indicators is 
about the same in Africa as it is in the rest of the developing world.  The coefficient for our proxy of 
natural resource intensity is negative and tends to be highly significant in our models with the 
expanded set of regressors and Africa interactions (Columns 3, 4 and 8).  The coefficient for its 
interaction with the Africa dummy is never significant. Thus, we reject the hypothesis that the 
relationship between natural resources and banking development is somehow different for Africa.  
In other words, the relatively low levels of banking development cannot be attributable to the curse 
of natural resources being more severe in Africa than in other parts of the developing world.16 
                                                 
16 When the bank ownership variables are included in the model the negative coefficients for the interaction between 
Africa and natural resource intensity, though not significant, become much larger (in absolute value). While this is 
suggestive of the resource curse being more severe in Africa, there is interplay between the natural resources variable 
and the foreign bank ownership variable that renders that conclusion dubious. Foreign owners are attracted to resource-
rich countries and thus there is a positive correlation between foreign bank ownership and our proxy for resource 
intensity (0.21, p-value 0.06). It is not therefore surprising that the inclusion of the foreign ownership variable has an 
effect on the coefficient for the endowment variable. In any event, the standard errors on its interaction with the Africa 
dummy are so large that the coefficient is telling us very little. 
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Concerning the regressors that are only included in the expanded set, the coefficient for real 
growth is negative and highly significant across all specifications for both indicators of financial 
development.  The coefficient for the Africa*growth interaction is positive and insignificant in the 
models without the ownership variables (Columns 3 and 7).  However, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the sum of the two coefficients (growth and Africa*growth) is zero.17  The same is 
true for the models with the ownership variables (Columns 4 and 8), even though the Africa*growth 
coefficients are negative (again see F-statistics near the bottom of Table 7).  This indicates again 
that the conditional convergence result does not hold in Africa, as was suggested by our simple 
comparison of the coefficients from the base model (Table 5) with those from the African models 
(Table 6). 
 Similar results hold for the inflation variable which remains negative and highly significant 
when the interactions are included in the regressions.  The interaction between inflation and the 
Africa dummy is positive, significant, and of a magnitude similar to that of the simple inflation 
variable.  We cannot, therefore, reject the hypothesis that the sum of the inflation and 
Africa*inflation variables is zero, which indicates that, like real growth, also inflation has not been 
associated with less financial development in Africa. 
A similar pattern also holds for the current account balance. Its coefficient is positive and 
highly significant across models without interactions, but it turns negative in all specifications and 
significant in most when interacted with the Africa dummy variable.  We cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the sum of the two coefficients is equal to zero; that is, that the current account 
balance has no effect on African banking development.  The regressions that include interaction 
terms therefore indicate that the high predicted levels of financial development for Africa from our 
base models derive, in part, from macroeconomic factors that matter only outside Africa. 
                                                 
17 The F-statistic and the p-value are, respectively, 0.001 and 0.97 for the liquid liabilities regression in Column 3, and 
0.07 and 0.80 for the private credit regression in Column 7. 
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 The pattern for the KKM index of institutional development is somewhat different than that 
for the macroeconomic variables.  Its coefficient is positive and significant in all specifications, 
indicating that it has been associated with banking development outside Africa.  Its interaction with 
the Africa dummy variable is insignificant for the liquid liabilities regression, and we cannot reject 
the hypothesis that the relationship found elsewhere also applies to Africa.  For the private credit 
regression, however, the interaction term is negative and significant, indicating that such 
relationship does not hold for Africa.  Moreover, summing the coefficient for KKM and its 
interaction with Africa, we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no relationship between 
institutional and banking development in Africa for either indicator (see F-statistics near the bottom 
of Table 7).  In short, the positive relationship between the KKM index and banking development is 
weaker in Africa than in other developing countries, and what relationship there is seems to apply 
only to the liabilities side of bank balance sheets rather than to the provision of credit. 
 
B.  Toward Resolving the African Finance Puzzle 
Are the determinants of financial development different in Africa?  The more refined 
analysis indicates that the determinants of banking development in Africa differ from the rest of the 
world in a significant way.  The difference arises even when Africa is benchmarked against other 
low income countries.  Of particular interest is the set of factors that matter outside Africa but not in 
Africa, and those that matter in Africa but not in the rest of the world.  
Let us focus on just a few of these factors.  While macroeconomic variables are important 
determinants of banking development in the rest of the world, they surprisingly lose power in the 
context of Africa.  Even an index of institutional development, as represented by the KKM index, 
shows up weak, particularly in the private credit dimension of banking development.  We also 
observe that the notion of a natural resource curse, which is largely popularized in the context of 
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resource-rich countries such as those in Africa, is insignificant in explaining the African financial 
development gap.  The one explanatory variable that stands out for Africa is population density.  
Our results show a relationship between population density and banking indicators for Africa, but 
not for the rest of the world. 
In general, the differences between the predicted and actual values of financial development 
for Africa become smaller when the interaction terms are included in the regressions.  In fact, the 
average difference for the models with full interactions is very close to zero.  No difference is 
greater than 0.06 or less than -0.06 for either indicator of banking development.  The majority of the 
predicted values lie within two percentage points of their actual levels.  The simple Africa dummy, 
which is really a measure of our ignorance about what drives African financial development, is no 
longer significant.   
Our findings suggest that, if mechanisms for holding down inflation, generating a current 
account surplus, and conditional convergence were to work in Africa as elsewhere, the levels of 
financial development would be higher.  At the same time, it remains a puzzle as to why those 
mechanisms do not seem to work in Africa, or what policies might help to start the relationship 
between macroeconomic fundamentals and financial development.  Perhaps a period of sustained 
economic growth will ignite those mechanisms, but the African puzzle continues in a different 
form.18  
 
                                                 
18 Another possibility is that variables that are important for African financial development are omitted from our 
models. For example, Easterly and Levine (1997) demonstrate that ethnic fractionalization explains a large share of 
factors that are linked to (slow) growth within Africa. We experimented with two types of variables: fractionalization 
and armed conflict. We use the fractionalization data as in Alesina et al. (2003); and we use the UCDP/PRIO dataset to 
calculate the average number of armed conflicts per year for each country. Neither variable is significant in our banking 
development regressions, and their inclusion does not alter the main qualitative results of our models. 
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C.  Additional Tests and Robustness Checks   
We now perform additional tests and robustness checks.  In particular, we analyze in further 
depth the role of population density, which shows up so strongly in Africa, and of foreign bank 
ownership, which has mixed effects.  Moreover, we consider another indicator of financial 
development as represented by the stock market development, and see whether a similar gap as the 
one found for banking development indicators arises in the context of stock markets.  Although 
stock markets still remain small and illiquid, African countries seem to have committed to the 
equity sector in promoting financial development and several stock exchanges have emerged in 
Africa in the recent past.   
1. Population density: We try to better understand why sparsely populated African countries have 
low levels of banking development by, first, examining the ‘shape’ of the relationship between 
density and financial development based on our regression models and, second, including additional 
variables related to population density in the regressions.  The final aim is to get a sense of what 
policy responses may be promising to improve financial development in Africa.  
 Figure 3 shows the relationship between population density and liquid liabilities/GDP for 
the typical African and non-African developing country based on Table 7.  Specifically, the vertical 
axis plots predicted values from Model 2 in Table 7.  For all variables other than population density, 
we use the mean value for the subsample (either Africa or other developing countries) multiplied by 
the appropriate coefficient for that subsample.  For population density, we run through the range of 
possible values and multiply by the appropriate coefficient for each subsample to generate the 
curvature.  Hence, non-population density factors (partially) account for the distance between the 
curves for Africa and that for other developing countries. 
Three features of the graph in Figure 3 are worth noting: (1) the largest differences between 
Africa and the rest of the developing world come at the lower end of the density scale; (2) density 
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affects financial development in all countries but the relationship is much steeper for Africa; and (3) 
although African countries tend to have lower population densities, there is substantial overlap for 
the two samples, which suggests that comparisons across the full range of the density spectrum are 
valid.  The picture points to important differences between Africa and the rest of the world, which 
could be due to the fact that the minimum viable scale in banking is greater in Africa than elsewhere 
or to other institutional or infrastructural failures.  Regardless of the explanation, Figure 3 highlights 
Africa’s difficulty in overcoming problems related to scale for the least densely populated countries. 
 Similarly to Figure 3, Figure 4 shows the relationship between population density and 
private credit/GDP based on the coefficients of Model 6 in Table 7.  As in the figure for liquid 
liabilities/GDP, the gap between Africa and the rest of the developing world is largest at the lowest 
levels of population density.  However, unlike for the liquid liabilities measure, that gap does not 
dramatically close at intermediate density levels.  This suggests that while differences in minimum 
viable scale could explain differences between Africa and the rest of the developing world with 
respect to savings, they cannot account for Africa’s lower levels of private credit over the full range 
of population densities.  
  To understand the aspects of population density that contribute to low levels of banking 
development in Africa, we include additional variables in our regressions that summarize (1) spatial 
population characteristics, such as large population agglomerations, (2) infrastructural and 
transportation development, and (3) physical banking presence (i.e., branch penetration measures). 
The results of these new regressions can help understand what policies may be effective in fostering 
African development.  If population agglomeration and infrastructural development can account for 
most of the strong relationship between population density and banking under-development in 
Africa, provision of financial services might improve as a natural consequence of broader 
economic/infrastructural improvements or policies that specifically encourage economic 
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participation by those that live outside urban agglomerates.  On the other hand, if measures of bank 
branch penetration are better able to account for the density/banking development relationship in 
Africa, then it is more likely that specific banking market failures, perhaps related to relatively high 
minimum viable scale, are at the heart of African under-performance. 
For spatial population characteristics, we include the percentage of the population residing 
in the largest city, the percent of the population in urban agglomerates, and a measure of population 
concentration with zero indicating a uniform distribution of residents across 20km by 20km cells 
and one indicating that the entire population is concentrated in a single 20km by 20km cell.  For 
infrastructural development we include roads per square km and railroad track per square km.  For 
bank penetration, we include commercial bank branches per 100,000 residents (demographic 
penetration) and branches per sq. km (geographic penetration).  Inclusion of many of these variables 
reduces sample size substantially and their coefficients are insignificant.  The results for the 
variables that do produce significant results (roads per sq.km, percentage of population in the 
largest city, and the two branch penetration measures) are presented in Table 8.   
The population density variable is no longer significant when any of these variables are 
introduced (in fact it becomes negative and significant when the geographic branch penetration 
variable is included), suggesting that roads, population in major cities, and bank branch penetration 
are all relevant factors in understanding the strong link between population density and financial 
development in Africa.  That said, only the coefficients for the percentage of population in the 
largest city and the geographic bank branch penetration measure are consistently significant across 
the models in Table 8.  This pattern is consistent with the notion that physical proximity to 
providers of financial services accounts for much of the variation in African banking development 
and thus the minimum viable scale is best achieved in major cities.   
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It is also worth noting that the links to financial development for the geographic penetration 
and largest city population variables are much stronger (in terms of statistical significance) for 
liquid liabilities to GDP than for private credit to GDP.  Again, overcoming difficulties associated 
with population density appears more effective on the savings side than on the credit side.  
2.  Bank foreign ownership: In Table 7 the foreign ownership variable has a negative and highly 
significant coefficient, while its interaction with the Africa dummy produces a positive coefficient 
that is significant and somewhat larger (in absolute value).  Summing those coefficients up, the net 
relationship between foreign ownership and our banking indicators for African countries is positive, 
though we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no relationship (i.e., that the coefficient for 
Africa is zero).  Still, whatever negative relationship there is between foreign ownership and 
banking development in the rest of the world, it does not seem to apply to Africa. 
While the share of banking sector assets controlled by foreign banks is perhaps the most 
obvious ownership measure to include in our regressions, non-random selection is a major concern, 
and its inclusion does affect other coefficients such as population density and natural resource 
intensity.  What we need is a variable that describes ownership patterns but is less endogenous to 
the process of financial development.  We therefore use the Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2008) 
indexes of limitations on foreign bank entry and ownership and of general requirements to enter into 
banking, reasoning that those restrictions provide an indication of a country’s predilections toward 
outside investment in its financial sector.  Such predilections can be easily overturned, as in times of 
financial crisis, and many countries, in fact, have a high degree of foreign ownership of the banking 
sector and restrictive rules on foreign entry.  We therefore think that the restrictions on entry and 
ownership are more plausibly exogenous, though we admit that these too are not perfect.  
Similarly to Barth et al. (2008), we find a negative coefficient for the index of foreign entry 
limitations when we include these indexes in the regressions in Table 7, or when we replace the 
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state and foreign ownership variables with them, though the coefficient is not always significant. 
The result suggests that countries with a predilection to restrict foreign presence are likely to have 
less banking development than others.  More importantly, when we replace the ownership variables 
with the restrictions on entry, the results for the population density variable are qualitatively very 
similar to those for regressions that do not include the ownership variables (Columns 3 and 7, Table 
7).  For that reason, we do not present the results using the indexes of restrictions in the paper.  The 
results from those regressions do, however, support the notion that the relationship between 
population density and banking sector development is important in Africa, but not elsewhere. 
3. Stock market development: We replace our indicators of banking development with indicators 
of stock market development, namely stock market capitalization and the value of traded shares, 
each divided by GDP, and re-run the models in Table 7. These are yearly observations that we 
average over the sample period for each country as described above.  We are unable to run our base 
models from Table 6 on the sample of African countries because so few of them have indicators of 
stock market development.   
The results from the full interaction models in Table 9 are notable only because none of the 
variables that are associated with stock market development in the rest of the developing world are 
important in Africa.  That is, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the relationship between any of 
the variables in our models and our indicators of African stock market development is zero (see F-
statistics at the bottom of Table 9).  This is very likely to depend on the early stage of development 
of stock markets in Africa.  Once these stock markets are better established, it might be easier to 
analyze the determinants of their development via cross-country regressions. 
 
V. Firm-level Tests on the Access to External Finance 
As mentioned earlier, cross-country studies focusing on country-level variables have been 
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criticized on several grounds.  For example, the observed results may be driven by measurement 
errors or unobservable factors.  As a final empirical exercise we turn to firm-level information 
drawn from the Investment Climate Surveys (ICS) conducted by the World Bank over the past 
decade.19  While country level indicators of banking development might suffer from measurement 
errors, firm-level responses about their use of financial services should not.  Also, our country level 
regressions involve one observation per country and thus have fewer degrees of freedom than what 
are available in firm-level regressions.  Finally, the firm-level data sets allow us to control for a 
number of potentially relevant firm characteristics (e.g., size, sector) that could explain substantial 
variations in the demand for and use of financial services.  For all of these reasons, the firm-level 
regressions could provide more precise estimates of the relationships between financial 
development and our explanatory variables than the country-level regressions.  Furthermore, to the 
extent that we derive similar qualitative results for the firm- and country-level regression, it 
provides additional, and perhaps stronger, support for the conclusions that we have drawn to this 
point based only on the country-level regressions. 
Table 10 presents summary statistics on our firm-level sample.  Firm characteristics (all 
dummy variables) include size (small, medium, and large based on the number of employees), 
industry (manufacturing, services, and others), exporter status and foreign ownership status.  It 
appears that there are more small firms and non-exporting firms in the African (excluding South 
Africa) sample than in other developing countries, while the fraction of firms with foreign 
ownership stakes is higher in the African sample.  Firm financing sources, for both short term 
(working capital) and long term (new investments) purposes, include internal (e.g., retained 
earnings) and external channels.  Following prior research, we focus on long term external 
financing from financial institutions, the most important external financing channel in most 
                                                 
19 These surveys have been used frequently in recent cross-country, firm-level studies on law, institutions, finance and 
growth (e.g., Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2005; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2005). 
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developing countries.  Specifically, the external finance dummy equals one if a firm has access to 
loans from domestic or foreign banks, or credit card debts from these institutions; and zero 
otherwise.  Almost 84% (74%) of firms in Africa (other developing countries) do not have access to 
financial institutions.20      
Our basic strategy is to pattern our firm-level regressions on the country-level regressions, 
but also to include variables that summarize firm characteristics.  We note, however, that we have 
all of the necessary variables for firms from only twelve countries in Africa.  Since the standard 
errors in our models allow for clustering at the country level, we are not able to include all of the 
country-level regressors that were in the cross-country regressions in Table 7, though the most 
important ones are included.21  Since the majority of firms in Africa and elsewhere do not have 
access to bank finance (Table 10), our dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the firm 
received any financing from a formal provider, rather than a continuous variable showing the 
importance of institutional finance among all financing sources.22  Table 11 reports the marginal 
effects from Probit regressions. 
The main result from Table 11 is that both the geographic and demographic bank branch 
penetration variables are positive and significant for African countries, though again the result is 
stronger for geographic penetration.  These variables are insignificant and of lower magnitudes in 
the rest of the developing world than for Africa.  By contrast, population density is positive and 
significant for non-African countries (models 1 and 2), but not for African countries when the 
                                                 
20 We only include firm observations for which data is available on whether the firm has access to all three external 
financing channels (domestic and foreign banks and credit cards).  Summary statistics reported in Table 10 represent the 
sample we use in regressions reported in Table 11.  
21 We performed a series of robustness checks in which we added each of the country-level variables from the country-
level regressions in Table 7 that do not appear in the firm-level regressions in Table 11, one at a time.  Qualitative 
results are very similar to those reported in Table 11. 
22 For the surveys completed through 2006, the dummy variable is equal to one if the firm reported a positive value for 
finance from local banks, foreign banks or credit cards. For the surveys after 2006, those questions were broadened to 
ask whether firms received finance from private or state owned commercial banks, or from non-bank financial 
institutions. Since banks are the main providers of financial services throughout the developing world, this slight change 
in question format does not present a major problem.  Regression results are very similar when we include a post-2006 
dummy variable.  
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variables for demographic and geographic bank branch penetration enter the regression.  This 
pattern confirms the results from the country-level regressions, and again points to the importance 
of physical proximity to providers of financial services in Africa relative to the rest of the 
developing world. 
Among the variables that were added to the country-level regression in Table 8, only the two 
bank branch penetration measures were strongly associated with use of external finance in the firm-
level regressions.  The variables capturing spatial characteristics of the population proved to be 
highly collinear with other regressors and thus we could not derive meaningful results for Africa 
when they were included.  We could not therefore test whether the percentage of the population in 
the largest city was associated with a greater likelihood of receiving long term financing from 
financial institutions for firms (as was indicated in the country-level regressions in Table 8).  We 
did, however, include the infrastructural variables in the firm-level regressions (Columns 3 and 4, 
Table 11).  Roads per sq. km were positive and significant in the rest of the developing world but it 
has the opposite effect in Africa.23  On the other hand, railroad track per sq. km was not significant 
in or outside Africa.  As with the country-level regressions, the pattern suggests that general 
infrastructural failures are not necessarily responsible for low levels of access to external finance for 
African firms, but rather failures specific to the banking sectors and markets for debt instruments. 
Finally, we note that firm characteristics explain a substantial amount of variation in firms’ 
access to financial institutions, supporting the notion that firm-level regressions offer more precise 
estimates than the country-level regressions.  The similarities and differences between Africa and 
the rest of the developing world are also instructive.  Firm size affects the use of external finance 
similarly in Africa and elsewhere, with smaller firms being at a substantial disadvantage relative to 
                                                 
23  Note that we can reject the hypothesis that population density has no impact for African firms in Column 3, based on 
the F-statistic at the bottom of Table 11. That is, population density is significantly positively associated with access to 
external finance for Africa.  Significant coefficients of opposite signs for roads per sq. km. and population density in 
that model are reflective of the high degree of collinearity between those two variables within Africa. 
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larger ones.  Foreign-owned firms use less external finance than local firms in Africa and elsewhere, 
perhaps because they have access to non-local sources of finance such as their parent companies.  
Differences arise with respect to industry affiliation.  In the rest of the developing world, 
manufacturing firms rely more heavily on external finance than other firms.  In Africa, those firms 
show no strong tendency to rely on external finance relative to others.   
 
VI. Conclusions  
The available evidence provides a convincing linkage between financial development and 
economic development.  Yet the level of financial development remains very low in Africa based 
on the standard indicators of banking and capital market development.  Surprisingly, we find that 
the African financial development gap is not even matched by what could be predicted from the 
benchmark financial development model.  When we conduct further analyses, including tests 
conducted at both country-level and firm-level, we find that the determinants of banking 
development in Africa differ from the rest of the world in a significant way.  The difference arises 
even when Africa is benchmarked against other low income countries.   
Some determinants of financial development matter both in Africa and elsewhere, but many 
others matter outside Africa but not so in Africa or, vice-versa.  For example, natural resource 
intensity is linked to lower levels of financial development in Africa and elsewhere, consistent with 
the notion of a resource curse (or, more charitably, that broad-based banking systems are unlikely to 
develop in economies dominated by a small number of large firms in extractive industries).  In 
contrast, population density appears to be more important in Africa than elsewhere, and our firm-
level study indicates that population density is linked more to bank branch penetration in Africa 
than in the rest of the developing economies.  Presumably, bank branch penetration figures remain 
low in Africa because of difficulties in achieving minimum viable scale in sparsely populated, low-
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income areas. This suggests that technological advances, such as mobile banking that enable users 
of financial services to be located far away from their financial institutions, could be a promising 
way to facilitate African financial development.  
An index of institutional development is linked to African banking development, but less 
strongly than in the rest of the developing world.  In particular, broad institutional development as 
reflected in the KKM index is positively linked to the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP in Africa as 
elsewhere, but not to the ratio of private credit to GDP.  General improvement in institutions might 
therefore help increase the level of deposits in the banking system, though it is not clear that those 
deposits would be intermediated well to the private sector based on Africa’s past experience. 
Other factors that are strongly linked to financial development in other countries are not 
linked to African financial development.  There is no evidence of conditional convergence for 
Africa (i.e., less financially-developed countries growing faster).  Inflation and the current account 
balance explain no variation in African financial development though they do in other developing 
countries.  Why this collection of macroeconomic fundamentals is not linked to African financial 
development remains unclear.  However, were countries to adopt policies that would enable these 
macroeconomic mechanisms to function, our results suggest that their levels of financial 
development would rise. 
 When we allow our explanatory variables to have different associations with banking 
development in Africa than in other developing countries, predicted and actual levels of African 
financial development become much closer, and the simple Africa dummy variable becomes 
insignificant.  This again suggests that the African financial development gap is attributable to 
differences in the underlying factors for banking development from the rest of the world, including, 
surprisingly, low income non-African countries.  Thus, while the level of financial development in 
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Africa is low, and hence disappointing, remedying that situation may require different measures 
from those that have worked elsewhere.   
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Table 1: Liquid Liabilities/GDP 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Sub-Saharan Africa  24.4% 23.9% 24.3% 24.7% 24.6% 25.5% 26.5% 27.6% 28.5% 29.2% 30.9% 32.5% 29.7% 
Angola AGO  11.3% 20.5% 20.0% 10.3% 10.3% 15.0% 16.7% 14.7% 12.7% 12.8% 14.2% 16.4% 
Benin BEN 23.2% 21.8% 21.4% 20.0% 21.6% 25.7% 27.5% 26.4% 25.5% 24.5% 24.9% 27.9% 27.9% 
Botswana BWA 20.9% 20.9% 20.7% 24.4% 27.4% 26.1% 24.9% 28.0% 27.6% 29.5% 28.2% 34.6% 40.2% 
Burkina Faso BFA 19.6% 20.1% 20.4% 20.0% 19.9% 20.4% 19.4% 18.0% 20.6% 22.1% 19.2% 18.6% 20.1% 
Burundi BDI 21.8% 21.3% 19.0% 16.6% 16.5% 19.3% 19.8% 21.9% 25.1% 24.6% 26.8% 32.1% 36.0% 
Cameroon CMR 14.4% 12.6% 12.2% 12.3% 12.7% 13.9% 15.1% 16.5% 17.0% 16.7% 16.8% 17.2% 18.1% 
Cape Verde CPV 64.3% 64.7% 65.5% 60.0% 55.4% 60.1% 63.3% 66.5% 68.4% 70.4% 73.0% 76.2% 78.1% 
Central African Republic CAF 21.6% 24.1% 22.2% 18.6% 17.1% 17.4% 16.4% 15.3% 15.2% 15.2% 16.8%   
Chad TCD 10.9% 13.2% 13.2% 11.6% 10.7% 11.1% 11.1% 12.3% 11.8% 8.0% 7.3% 9.6% 11.6% 
Congo, Dem. Rep. ZAR 3.2%       4.1% 4.9% 6.4% 7.6% 8.5% 10.8% 
Congo, Rep. COG 15.3% 13.7%   13.1% 11.7% 14.1% 12.8% 14.1% 13.5% 13.3% 13.6% 18.5% 
Cote d'Ivoire CIV 27.4% 26.5% 22.9% 22.3% 22.2% 22.3% 22.4% 25.9% 25.8% 22.7% 23.5% 24.1% 25.8% 
Equatorial Guinea GNQ 9.5% 10.9% 5.7% 7.0% 6.6% 4.8% 4.8% 6.4% 8.4% 7.7%    
Ethiopia ETH 41.5% 38.7% 38.3% 42.6% 43.5% 45.8% 47.7% 43.7% 49.3% 44.6% 46.8% 40.1%  
Gabon GAB 13.9% 13.2% 14.3% 17.3% 16.9% 13.9% 17.4% 16.9% 17.0% 16.3% 16.4% 16.8% 20.0% 
Gambia, The GMB 23.9% 24.4% 26.1% 28.7% 28.5% 32.1% 33.2% 37.1% 38.5% 42.2% 43.9% 48.3%  
Ghana GHA 19.3% 18.1% 21.3% 22.2% 22.3% 23.2% 24.0% 25.7% 28.2% 29.3% 28.9% 29.5%  
Guinea-Bissau GNB 8.1% 10.3% 17.5% 29.6% 27.2% 36.0% 47.1% 57.8% 42.5% 24.2% 29.7% 31.4% 32.9% 
Kenya KEN 48.2% 38.0% 39.4% 39.0% 38.4% 37.5% 36.4% 37.8% 39.5% 39.0% 38.4% 39.8% 37.1% 
Lesotho LSO 32.4% 31.1%   31.7% 28.8% 26.8% 32.7% 28.6% 27.6% 26.8% 30.3% 33.9% 
Madagascar MDG 18.6% 17.6% 18.4% 18.5% 18.1% 19.1% 20.4% 24.8% 22.2% 21.8% 20.0% 19.5% 20.5% 
Malawi MWI 17.6% 16.0% 15.0% 15.3% 17.4% 18.4% 20.4% 21.2% 22.2% 23.7% 25.5% 24.9% 19.1% 
Mali MLI 18.7% 20.7% 21.2% 20.9% 20.0% 20.2% 20.3% 24.4% 29.0% 29.3% 29.3% 28.0% 26.5% 
Mauritania MRT 19.9% 17.2% 15.8% 14.8% 13.9% 13.7% 14.6% 15.0% 12.5%     
Mauritius MUS 71.9% 71.7% 72.7% 72.7% 75.9% 75.8% 76.3% 79.9% 97.1% 117.5% 134.4% 156.1% 94.8% 
Mozambique MOZ 22.9% 20.0% 19.1% 19.3% 21.8% 28.1% 25.0% 25.2% 26.3% 25.0% 25.1% 27.1% 0.0% 
Niger NER 14.1% 12.8% 10.5% 7.5% 6.9% 8.4% 9.4% 9.8% 10.8% 13.9% 14.0% 14.4% 15.0% 
Nigeria NGA 16.0% 12.9% 13.9% 16.7% 18.8% 17.5% 25.1% 26.8% 24.8% 24.4% 17.4% 17.3% 20.5% 
Rwanda RWA  15.4% 13.8% 14.5% 14.7% 15.1% 16.3% 17.2% 16.1% 17.0% 18.0%   
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Senegal SEN 20.0% 20.3% 20.8% 20.4% 21.2% 22.5% 23.6% 25.0% 28.1% 32.0% 32.5% 33.8% 33.1% 
Seychelles SYC 65.4% 72.0% 73.4% 75.4% 84.6% 87.9% 96.7% 100.9% 108.6% 117.2% 127.2% 117.0% 98.4% 
Sierra Leone SLE 9.4% 9.2% 11.3% 12.4% 15.8% 15.3% 16.0% 16.6% 18.1% 17.8% 19.0% 18.9% 19.6% 
South Africa ZAF 47.0% 47.6% 50.2% 53.3% 54.4% 52.7% 48.3% 42.5% 41.9% 40.4% 41.4% 53.0% 45.0% 
Sudan SDN 12.0% 9.5% 7.4% 7.9% 8.6% 9.3% 11.2%     0.2% 0.2% 
Swaziland SWZ 24.7% 23.3% 23.8% 24.6% 24.8% 23.6% 20.4% 19.8% 19.5% 19.9% 19.7% 20.8%  
Tanzania TZA 22.7% 22.0% 19.6% 18.4% 18.0% 18.6% 19.0% 20.0% 21.5% 21.1% 24.6% 27.4% 26.5% 
Togo TGO 23.5% 23.0% 20.0% 21.4% 21.1% 24.5% 26.1% 24.0% 23.9% 26.4% 28.5% 31.0% 33.3% 
Uganda UGA 10.3% 11.0% 11.7% 12.6% 13.7% 14.2% 15.3% 16.7% 17.7% 17.7% 17.9% 18.4% 20.3% 
Zambia ZMB 13.9% 15.6% 15.3% 16.4% 16.9% 19.0% 19.1% 18.2% 18.5% 18.8% 17.8% 17.6% 20.8% 
Zimbabwe ZWE 40.4% 39.0% 43.8% 37.1% 28.8% 28.5% 22.7%       
DEVELOPING  
COUNTRIES 
 
34.5% 34.2% 35.7% 37.0% 37.6% 37.9% 39.9% 41.7% 41.5% 42.0% 43.2% 46.8% 46.8% 
East Asia & Pacific  43.7% 43.9% 46.0% 47.6% 48.0% 49.0% 51.0% 51.3% 51.8% 52.1% 49.6% 54.2% 58.2% 
Europe & Central Asia  28.4% 26.9% 27.8% 28.4% 29.3% 30.5% 33.5% 35.5% 36.3% 37.7% 40.3% 43.6% 42.8% 
Latin America &  
Caribbean 
 
40.1% 41.7% 44.2% 46.6% 48.4% 47.0% 49.5% 51.5% 49.4% 48.7% 49.2% 55.3% 54.1% 
Middle East & North  
Africa 
 
56.7% 54.3% 55.3% 54.9% 58.8% 59.1% 63.4% 64.3% 64.7% 64.3% 70.3% 62.3% 71.5% 
South Asia  36.3% 35.9% 36.2% 38.8% 39.9% 40.6% 42.4% 45.8% 47.7% 49.9% 51.7% 53.8% 55.1% 
Sub-Saharan Africa  24.4% 23.9% 24.3% 24.7% 24.6% 25.5% 26.5% 27.6% 28.5% 29.2% 30.9% 32.5% 29.7% 
 
Data source: World Bank Database on Financial Development and Structure. See Thorsten Beck and Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, "Financial Institutions and Markets 
Across Countries and over Time: Data and Analysis", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4943, May 2009. 
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Table 2: Private Credit Extended by Deposit Money Banks/GDP 
 
   1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Sub-Saharan Africa  12.1% 11.7% 12.1% 13.0% 13.5% 13.9% 14.0% 14.1% 14.4% 14.6% 15.5% 16.1% 16.6% 
Angola AGO  1.4% 3.3% 3.9% 1.3% 1.1% 2.1% 3.2% 3.7% 4.1% 4.5% 5.7% 8.3% 
Benin BEN 7.2% 7.5% 6.5% 5.9% 8.6% 10.6% 10.4% 10.5% 12.5% 14.0% 15.1% 16.2% 16.4% 
Botswana BWA 13.0% 11.4% 9.7% 10.5% 12.6% 14.0% 13.9% 16.7% 18.0% 19.6% 19.4% 19.6% 19.3% 
Burkina Faso BFA 5.7% 5.8% 7.9% 9.7% 10.1% 11.0% 11.5% 12.3% 12.6% 13.0% 14.3% 16.1% 15.8% 
Burundi BDI 13.1% 12.5% 11.2% 11.7% 12.7% 16.8% 19.7% 21.1% 23.6% 21.0% 19.4% 18.3% 20.8% 
Cameroon CMR 8.0% 7.7% 7.0% 6.7% 7.3% 7.7% 8.2% 8.4% 8.9% 8.9% 9.0% 9.1% 8.9% 
Cape Verde CPV 21.4% 23.6% 26.2% 27.7% 32.0% 37.5% 37.3% 38.5% 39.9% 41.1% 40.7% 42.5% 44.9% 
Central African Republic CAF 3.8% 4.5% 4.3% 4.6% 4.6% 4.7% 4.9% 5.4% 6.2% 6.7% 6.9%   
Chad TCD 3.6% 3.6% 3.3% 3.3% 3.6% 3.4% 3.2% 3.7% 4.0% 3.0% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 
Congo, Dem. Rep. ZAR 0.4%       0.6% 0.7% 1.1% 1.6% 2.2% 3.1% 
Congo, Rep. COG 7.7% 7.3%   9.1% 5.6% 5.0% 3.8% 3.3% 3.2% 2.5% 2.0% 2.3% 
Cote d'Ivoire CIV 18.9% 18.3% 16.0% 15.9% 14.9% 14.9% 15.0% 14.6% 14.0% 13.7% 13.7% 13.5% 14.1% 
Equatorial Guinea GNQ 2.8% 3.7% 3.0% 4.7% 4.2% 2.8% 2.7% 3.5% 3.5% 2.4%    
Ethiopia ETH 8.7% 13.5% 16.4% 19.1% 21.6% 23.3% 22.9% 18.9% 19.2% 16.5% 18.4% 18.1% 17.5% 
Gabon GAB 7.2% 6.6% 7.4% 10.4% 10.7% 8.5% 10.9% 11.4% 11.4% 9.3% 7.7% 7.8% 11.1% 
Gambia, The GMB 10.1% 8.9% 9.3% 10.5% 11.1% 11.6% 11.6% 13.8% 13.9% 12.8% 11.8% 13.5%  
Ghana GHA 4.5% 4.8% 6.8% 8.3% 10.3% 11.7% 11.2% 10.6% 10.9% 11.6% 13.5% 15.4%  
Guinea-Bissau GNB 3.9% 3.7% 4.2% 7.2% 7.2% 7.5% 5.7% 3.2% 2.5% 1.6% 1.7% 2.8% 4.4% 
Kenya KEN 21.5% 19.6% 21.9% 23.4% 24.9% 25.6% 24.1% 23.5% 23.1% 23.2% 23.8% 24.3% 22.4% 
Lesotho LSO 20.1% 16.6%   15.0% 14.0% 12.3% 14.7% 9.5% 5.6% 6.7% 8.1% 9.1% 
Madagascar MDG 11.0% 9.7% 9.2% 8.8% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.7% 7.9% 8.5% 9.0% 9.3% 9.4% 
Malawi MWI 6.0% 3.9% 3.5% 4.3% 4.7% 4.5% 4.9% 4.7% 5.0% 5.6% 6.4% 7.6% 6.2% 
Mali MLI 8.1% 10.9% 11.7% 13.3% 14.9% 14.9% 14.2% 16.6% 18.4% 18.8% 18.8% 16.8% 16.0% 
Mauritania MRT 27.5% 22.1% 22.1% 21.0% 21.5% 23.6% 25.9% 28.1% 24.3%     
Mauritius MUS 44.4% 42.7% 44.5% 50.0% 54.9% 54.2% 55.1% 56.7% 62.9% 69.2% 72.6% 72.2% 71.6% 
Mozambique MOZ 9.4% 9.3% 10.8% 12.3% 14.4% 17.8% 12.7% 9.1% 8.6% 8.3% 9.0% 12.0% 0.0% 
Niger NER 6.1% 4.2% 3.7% 3.5% 3.9% 4.7% 5.0% 5.1% 5.2% 6.0% 6.5% 7.6% 8.2% 
Nigeria NGA 9.2% 8.4% 9.7% 11.8% 12.5% 10.4% 14.9% 16.1% 14.6% 15.3% 12.2% 12.1% 17.3% 
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Rwanda RWA  6.7% 6.4% 8.0% 8.8% 9.1% 9.8% 10.1% 9.3% 9.9% 11.0%   
Senegal SEN 14.6% 14.7% 15.3% 14.6% 14.5% 16.5% 17.8% 17.9% 18.3% 19.3% 20.5% 22.0% 20.8% 
Seychelles SYC 10.4% 11.8% 12.4% 13.2% 14.4% 15.1% 17.5% 18.9% 23.3% 28.0% 31.7% 29.8% 30.0% 
Sierra Leone SLE 2.6% 2.3% 2.5% 2.4% 2.5% 1.9% 1.9% 2.1% 3.0% 3.9% 4.3% 4.0% 4.5% 
South Africa ZAF 55.4% 57.1% 60.0% 63.5% 65.2% 65.0% 69.8% 63.8% 59.7% 62.2% 65.4% 70.7% 77.1% 
Sudan SDN 2.4% 2.2% 1.9% 1.8% 1.7% 1.8% 2.5%     0.1% 0.1% 
Swaziland SWZ 18.7% 16.6% 15.7% 15.3% 14.2% 13.9% 11.6% 10.9% 12.8% 15.7% 18.3% 20.5%  
Tanzania TZA 7.3% 4.4% 3.1% 3.7% 4.3% 4.4% 4.5% 5.2% 6.6% 7.5% 8.9% 10.6% 12.1% 
Togo TGO 15.0% 16.1% 15.4% 17.2% 15.9% 15.7% 15.3% 13.4% 14.2% 15.9% 16.9% 17.3% 18.0% 
Uganda UGA 3.7% 4.4% 4.5% 4.6% 5.2% 5.2% 5.0% 5.0% 5.3% 5.5% 5.4% 5.9% 7.4% 
Zambia ZMB 6.1% 7.5% 7.2% 6.6% 6.2% 6.7% 6.6% 5.8% 5.6% 6.5% 7.0% 7.7% 10.1% 
Zimbabwe ZWE 22.0% 19.7% 22.4% 22.4% 18.4% 16.4% 11.7%       
DEVELOPING  
COUNTRIES 
 
22.3% 22.3% 23.8% 25.3% 25.7% 25.2% 25.6% 25.7% 25.4% 25.7% 27.5% 30.4% 32.5% 
East Asia & Pacific  34.4% 35.4% 38.7% 40.6% 37.1% 34.5% 34.5% 34.2% 34.6% 34.9% 36.1% 40.3% 42.5% 
Europe & Central Asia  19.6% 17.7% 17.6% 18.2% 18.5% 18.2% 18.6% 19.1% 20.8% 23.5% 27.8% 34.0% 37.0% 
Latin America &  
Caribbean 
 
29.9% 31.3% 33.7% 36.4% 38.5% 37.9% 38.4% 37.9% 34.6% 33.4% 33.4% 37.7% 40.1% 
Middle East & North  
Africa 
 
28.6% 29.1% 31.4% 31.5% 36.4% 36.7% 38.3% 36.6% 39.5% 39.0% 44.5% 35.2% 43.9% 
South Asia  18.1% 18.9% 19.5% 20.7% 21.3% 21.4% 21.7% 23.3% 24.3% 26.7% 30.7% 34.3% 33.6% 
Sub-Saharan Africa  12.1% 11.7% 12.1% 13.0% 13.5% 13.9% 14.0% 14.1% 14.4% 14.6% 15.5% 16.1% 16.6% 
Data source: World Bank Database on Financial Development and Structure. See Thorsten Beck and Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, "Financial Institutions and Markets 
Across Countries and over Time: Data and Analysis", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4943, May 2009. 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics on the Country Sample 
 
World (minus Africa) Sub-Saharan Africa Variable 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Liquid liabilities / GDP 64.2% 47.4% 27.5% 17.7% 
Private credit / GDP 57.7% 45.3% 17.6% 22.7% 
Stock Market Capitalization / GDP 52.1% 60.0% 25.6% 43.8% 
Stock Market Value Traded / GDP 34.1% 50.9% 6.5% 20.0% 
Ln(Population) 2.44 1.59 2.24 1.33 
Ln(Population density) 0.44 1.94 0.09 0.12 
Natural resources 0.5 2.41 0.15 0.77 
Offshore center 4.4% 20.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
Ln(Per capita income) 2.25 1.04 0.38 0.94 
Population * GDP per capita 0.48 1.35 0.03 0.07 
Real GDP growth rate 4.1% 2.5% 4.8% 2.7% 
Inflation rate 5.2% 5.2% 9.3% 15.0% 
Current Account balance / GDP 0.2% 8.1% -3.8% 6.7% 
KKM index 0.33 0.9 -0.54 0.58 
Bank concentration 0.65 0.19 0.81 0.14 
Foreign ownership share 27.1% 25.9% 44.4% 24.4% 
State ownership share 15.9% 19.7% 13.3% 16.6% 
Manufacturing / GDP 16.8% 6.1% 11.0% 7.3% 
Secondary/Primary school enrollment 0.81 0.24 0.33 0.18 
Roads / Area 1.07 1.65 0.21 0.22 
Railroads / Area 0.03 0.03 0 0 
Urban population 63.6% 20.7% 36.2% 17.2% 
Geographic branch penetration 29.76 80.07 7.97 22.49 
Demographic branch penetration 16.51 17.28 2.86 3.64 
Data sources: For liquid liabilities/GDP, private credit/GDP, stock market capitalization/GDP, stock market 
value traded/GDP, and bank concentration: World Bank Database on Financial Development and Structure. 
See Thorsten Beck and Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, "Financial Institutions and Markets Across Countries and 
over Time: Data and Analysis"", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4943, May 2009.  
Natural resources is the Lederman and Maloney (2008) measure of net exports in resource intensive 
industries as described in the text. Offshore center is a dummy variable defined by IMF (2007), “Financial 
Soundness Indicators: Experience with the Coordinated Compilation Exercise and Next Steps”, STA Dept. 
The KKM index is the measure of broad institutional development created by Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Maztruzzi (2007). Foreign and state ownership share of banking sector assets are from the World Bank 
Database of Bank Regulation and Supervision (2008). Geographic and demographic branch penetration are 
from CGAP, “Financial Access 2009: Measuring Access to Financial Services in 135 Countries.” All other 
variables are from World Development Indicators.  
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Table 4: Correlations Tests: World (minus Africa) sample 
 
N = 90 
Liquid 
liab. /  
GDP 
Priv 
credit  
/ GDP 
Stock  
mkt  
capit 
/ GDP 
Stock 
mkt val  
traded /  
GDP 
Ln(Pop) Ln(Pop density) 
Nat 
res 
Offsh 
center 
Ln(Per 
capita 
income) 
Pop * 
GDP 
per 
capita 
Real  
GDP  
gr. rate 
Infl. 
rate 
CA 
balance 
/ GDP 
KKM 
index 
Bank 
conc 
Forgn 
own 
share 
State 
own  
share 
Manuf 
/ GDP 
Private credit / GDP 0.64* 1                 
Stock market 
capitalization / GDP 0.68* 0.65* 1                
Stock market value traded 
/ GDP 0.40* 0.70* 0.75* 1               
Ln(Population) -0.08 0.03 -0.02 0.24* 1              
Ln(Population density) 0.38* 0.13 0.61* 0.10 -0.20 1             
Natural resources -0.22* 0.06 -0.06 0.03 -0.19 -0.21* 1            
Offshore center 0.19 0.10 0.08 -0.08 -0.25* 0.41* -0.07 1           
Ln(Per capita income) 0.49* 0.71* 0.51* 0.51* -0.15 0.18 0.22* 0.04 1          
Population * GDP per 
capita 0.13 0.38* 0.18 0.47* 0.47* -0.05 -0.12 -0.07 0.26* 1         
Real GDP growth rate -0.17 -0.36* -0.20 -0.25* -0.18 0.31* 0.00 0.22* -0.26* -0.19 1        
Inflation rate -0.40* -0.48* -0.35* -0.32* 0.15 -0.18 -0.08 -0.16 -0.39* -0.10 -0.04 1       
Current Account balance 
/ GDP 0.37* 0.22* 0.45* 0.27* 0.02 0.58* 0.25* 0.18 0.34* -0.02 0.09 -0.17 1      
KKM index 0.51* 0.79* 0.51* 0.50* -0.19 0.13 0.16 0.01 0.88* 0.21* -0.27* -0.48* 0.17 1     
Bank concentration -0.11 0.01 0.12 0.04 -0.50* 0.07 0.21 -0.02 0.03 -0.35* -0.03 -0.16 -0.06 0.18 1    
Foreign ownership share 0.08 -0.17 -0.02 -0.25* -0.43* 0.21 -0.09 0.15 0.14 -0.23* 0.11 -0.13 0.02 0.14 0.08 1   
State ownership share -0.14 -0.28* -0.28* -0.14 0.43* -0.11 -0.09 -0.15 -0.41* -0.03 0.08 0.26* -0.05 -0.39* -0.16 -0.32* 1  
Manufacturing / GDP -0.07 0.08 -0.15 -0.02 0.35* -0.18 -0.26* -0.12 0.03 0.05 -0.07 0.06 -0.15 0.10 -0.22* -0.02 0.11 1 
Secondary/Primary 
school enrollment 0.25* 0.51* 0.27* 0.34* -0.18 -0.01 0.25* -0.12 0.76* 0.14 -0.15 -0.32* 0.08 0.76* 0.19 0.16 -0.33* 0.07 
 
Notes: (* p<0.05). 
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Table 5: Regressions on Banking Sector Development for the sample of non-African countries 
 
This table presents OLS regressions of banking sector development, measured by liquid liabilities/GDP and credit to 
the private sector extended by deposit money banks/GDP ratios, on a set of country-level variables including 
endowment (population and resources), macroeconomics, institutions, banking structure and other variables. We 
present models for all non-African countries and for (non-African) low and middle income countries separately. 
White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are presented in the brackets below coefficients. 
 
 Liquid liabilities / GDP  Private credit / GDP 
 All  Low + Middle income  All  Low + Middle income 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Ln(Population) -0.0166 -0.0527  -0.0015 -0.0254  0.0028 -0.0078  0.0022 -0.0056 
 (0.0208) (0.0380)  (0.0194) (0.0369)  (0.0177) (0.0258)  (0.0166) (0.0269) 
Ln(Population Density) 0.0737*** 0.0231  0.0358 -0.0210  0.0183 -0.0096  0.0321* -0.0359** 
 (0.0227) (0.0320)  (0.0216) (0.0230)  (0.0193) (0.0217)  (0.0185) (0.0168) 
Natural Resources -0.0379*** -0.0706***  -0.0338 -0.1232***  -0.0215* -0.0163  -0.0103 -0.0739*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0206)  (0.0330) (0.0358)  (0.0115) (0.0140)  (0.0283) (0.0261) 
Offshore Center 0.2474* 0.0427  0.3689*** 0.4527***  0.1910 0.2152  0.3744*** 0.4665*** 
 (0.1446) (0.2257)  (0.1122) (0.1409)  (0.1230) (0.1533)  (0.0963) (0.1027) 
Ln(Per Capita Income) 0.2224*** -0.0107  0.0561 -0.0352  0.2755*** -0.0250  0.0890** -0.0401 
 (0.0360) (0.0944)  (0.0394) (0.0607)  (0.0307) (0.0641)  (0.0338) (0.0442) 
Population * GDP Per Capita 0.0036 -0.0294  0.0062 -0.0211  0.0709** 0.0360  -0.0310 -0.1067 
 (0.0322) (0.0356)  (0.0996) (0.0963)  (0.0274) (0.0242)  (0.0855) (0.0702) 
Real GDP Growth Rate  -2.4522   -2.9588***   -2.7708**   -1.9655** 
  (1.7429)   (1.0568)   (1.1840)   (0.7702) 
Inflation Rate  -1.9594**   -1.4354***   -1.5967***   -1.3253*** 
  (0.8519)   (0.4828)   (0.5787)   (0.3519) 
Current Account Balance / GDP  1.7549***   2.1899***   0.6738   1.7564*** 
  (0.6488)   (0.6424)   (0.4408)   (0.4681) 
KKM Index  0.3115***   0.2314***   0.3991***   0.2636*** 
  (0.1014)   (0.0698)   (0.0689)   (0.0509) 
Bank Concentration  -0.7417***   0.2428   -0.2201   -0.0569 
  (0.2738)   (0.2006)   (0.1860)   (0.1462) 
Foreign Ownership Share  -0.1360   -0.4900***   -0.5068***   -0.4412*** 
  (0.1652)   (0.1332)   (0.1123)   (0.0970) 
State Ownership Share  0.2670   0.1729   -0.1087   -0.0023 
  (0.2283)   (0.1434)   (0.1551)   (0.1045) 
Manufacturing / GDP  -1.2926*   0.8164   0.0218   0.7072* 
  (0.7024)   (0.5553)   (0.4772)   (0.4047) 
Secondary/Primary Enrollment  -0.1634   0.0768   -0.1602   -0.0006 
  (0.2863)   (0.1848)   (0.1945)   (0.1346) 
Constant 0.3828*** 1.8167***  0.4669*** 0.6153**  -0.0408 1.0934***  0.2481*** 0.6247*** 
 (0.1228) (0.3637)  (0.1012) (0.2476)  (0.1044) (0.2471)  (0.0869) (0.1804) 
Adjusted R2 0.4087 0.5392  0.1401 0.5633  0.5358 0.7607  0.2190 0.7083 
Observations/Countries 111 86  75 56  111 86  75 56 
 
       Notes: (* p< 0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
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Table 6: Regressions on Banking Development for the sample of African countries 
 
This table presents OLS regressions of banking sector development, measured by liquid liabilities/GDP and credit to 
the private sector from deposit money banks/GDP ratios, on a set of country-level variables including endowment 
(population and resources), macroeconomics, institutions, banking structure and other variables. We present models 
for all the sub-Saharan African countries, with and without South Africa.  White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors are presented in the brackets below coefficients. 
 
 Liquid liabilities / GDP  Private credit / GDP 
 All  Without South Africa  All  Without South Africa 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Ln(Population) -0.0352 0.0434  -0.0289 0.0430  -0.0575** 0.0175  -0.0074 0.0182 
 (0.0258) (0.0377)  (0.0307) (0.0378)  (0.0237) (0.0343)  (0.0223) (0.0301) 
Ln(Population Density) 0.0736*** 0.0994***  0.0750*** 0.0963***  0.0314* 0.0547**  0.0426*** 0.0614*** 
 (0.0193) (0.0228)  (0.0198) (0.0230)  (0.0177) (0.0207)  (0.0145) (0.0184) 
Natural Resources -0.0331 -0.0216  -0.0324 -0.0227  -0.0297 -0.0211  -0.0241 -0.0188 
 (0.0361) (0.0461)  (0.0366) (0.0462)  (0.0331) (0.0420)  (0.0267) (0.0368) 
Offshore Center - -  - -  - -  - - 
            
Ln(Per Capita Income) 0.0384 0.1190  0.0433 0.1268  0.0093 0.0944  0.0476* 0.0777 
 (0.0347) (0.0860)  (0.0372) (0.0866)  (0.0318) (0.0783)  (0.0271) (0.0690) 
Population * GDP Per Capita 0.4408 -0.7936  0.0538 0.1711  2.9359*** 1.9997***  -0.1431 -0.0626 
 (0.5198) (0.5625)  (1.1164) (1.1476)  (0.4771) (0.5120)  (0.8137) (0.9143) 
Real GDP Growth Rate  0.0689   0.0595   -0.3337   -0.3137 
  (0.9972)   (0.9990)   (0.9076)   (0.7959) 
Inflation Rate  -0.0339   -0.0627   -0.1369   -0.0755 
  (0.1861)   (0.1888)   (0.1694)   (0.1504) 
Current Account Balance / GDP  -0.4724   -0.6862   -0.6882   -0.2311 
  (0.5972)   (0.6380)   (0.5436)   (0.5083) 
KKM Index  0.1023*   0.1061*   0.0655   0.0574 
  (0.0581)   (0.0584)   (0.0529)   (0.0465) 
Bank Concentration  0.1558   0.2877   0.3582*   0.0761 
  (0.2254)   (0.2640)   (0.2052)   (0.2103) 
Foreign Ownership Share            
            
State Ownership Share            
            
Manufacturing / GDP  -0.4667   -0.3660   -0.0215   -0.2366 
  (0.4299)   (0.4431)   (0.3912)   (0.3530) 
Secondary/Primary Enrollment  0.2810   0.2768   0.1286   0.1377 
  (0.2348)   (0.2353)   (0.2137)   (0.1874) 
Constant 0.5479*** 0.3340  0.5452*** 0.1840  0.2969*** -0.0877  0.2752*** 0.2330 
 (0.0779) (0.2613)  (0.0793) (0.3044)  (0.0715) (0.2378)  (0.0578) (0.2425) 
Adjusted R2 0.3559 0.5977  0.3383 0.5992  0.6411 0.7981  0.2360 0.4452 
Observations/Countries 38 32  37 31  38 32  37 31 
 
Notes: (* p< 0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
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Table 7: Regressions for the combined sample of low and middle income and African countries 
 
This table presents OLS regressions of banking sector development, measured by liquid liabilities/GDP and credit to the 
private sector from deposit money banks/GDP ratios, on a set of country-level variables including endowment (population 
and resources), macroeconomics, institutions, banking structure and other variables. We include all the low and middle 
income countries (including Africa, excluding South Africa), an African dummy variable, and interactions between each of 
our explanatory variables and the Africa dummy. White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are presented in the 
brackets below coefficients, and F-statistics are shown at the bottom of the table. 
 
 Liquid Liabilities / GDP  Private Credit / GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Africa -0.1046* 0.0783 -0.3391 -0.2065  -0.0657 0.0270 -0.3308 -0.1155 
 (0.0536) (0.1470) (0.5469) (0.5858)  (0.0449) (0.1235) (0.4144) (0.4312) 
Ln(Population) -0.0095 -0.0015 0.0162 -0.0254  0.0005 0.0022 0.0051 -0.0056 
 (0.0149) (0.0174) (0.0353) (0.0342)  (0.0125) (0.0146) (0.0268) (0.0252) 
Ln(Population Density) 0.0498*** 0.0358* 0.0165 -0.0210  0.0363*** 0.0321* -0.0080 -0.0359** 
 (0.0156) (0.0194) (0.0223) (0.0214)  (0.0131) (0.0163) (0.0169) (0.0157) 
Natural Resources -0.0308 -0.0338 -0.0661** -0.1232***  -0.0118 -0.0103 -0.0113 -0.0739***
 (0.0255) (0.0296) (0.0327) (0.0331)  (0.0213) (0.0249) (0.0248) (0.0244) 
Offshore Center 0.3626*** 0.3689*** 0.4319*** 0.4527***  0.3783*** 0.3744*** 0.5125*** 0.4665***
 (0.0980) (0.1007) (0.1189) (0.1306)  (0.0822) (0.0846) (0.0901) (0.0962) 
Ln(Per Capita Income) 0.0524** 0.0561 -0.0850 -0.0352  0.0697*** 0.0890*** -0.1016** -0.0401 
 (0.0264) (0.0353) (0.0594) (0.0562)  (0.0221) (0.0297) (0.0450) (0.0414) 
Population * GDP Per Capita 0.0305 0.0062 -0.0325 -0.0211  -0.0227 -0.0310 -0.0823 -0.1067 
 (0.0842) (0.0894) (0.0995) (0.0893)  (0.0706) (0.0751) (0.0754) (0.0657) 
Real GDP Growth Rate   -2.6241** -2.9588***    -1.7676** -1.9655***
   (1.0577) (0.9797)    (0.8015) (0.7211) 
Inflation Rate   -1.1082** -1.4354***    -0.8747** -1.3253***
   (0.4710) (0.4476)    (0.3569) (0.3295) 
Current Account Balance / GDP   1.9057*** 2.1899***    1.2912*** 1.7564***
   (0.5981) (0.5955)    (0.4532) (0.4383) 
KKM Index   0.1776** 0.2314***    0.2230*** 0.2636***
   (0.0708) (0.0647)    (0.0537) (0.0477) 
Bank Concentration   0.2450 0.2428    -0.1022 -0.0569 
   (0.1659) (0.1860)    (0.1257) (0.1369) 
Foreign Ownership Share    -0.4900***     -0.4412***
    (0.1234)     (0.0909) 
State Ownership Share    0.1729     -0.0023 
    (0.1329)     (0.0978) 
Manufacturing / GDP   0.6614 0.8164    0.8498** 0.7072* 
   (0.5421) (0.5148)    (0.4108) (0.3789) 
Secondary/Primary Enrollment   0.1211 0.0768    0.0174 -0.0006 
   (0.1710) (0.1713)    (0.1296) (0.1261) 
Interactions with Africa dummy          
    Ln(Population)  -0.0274 0.0268 0.0356   -0.0096 0.0131 -0.0187 
  (0.0480) (0.0698) (0.0792)   (0.0403) (0.0529) (0.0583) 
    Ln(Population Density)  0.0393 0.0797* 0.0839   0.0105 0.0695** 0.0582 
  (0.0348) (0.0430) (0.0530)   (0.0293) (0.0325) (0.0390) 
    Natural Resources  0.0014 0.0435 -1.1741   -0.0138 -0.0075 -0.9141 
  (0.0611) (0.0805) (1.0234)   (0.0513) (0.0610) (0.7533) 
    Ln(Per Capita Income)  -0.0129 0.2118 0.0773   -0.0414 0.1793 0.0244 
  (0.0647) (0.1501) (0.1691)   (0.0544) (0.1137) (0.1244) 
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    Population * GDP Per Capita  0.0476 0.2037 1.6074   -0.1121 0.0197 0.7983 
  (1.6292) (1.8301) (2.2528)   (1.3691) (1.3868) (1.6583) 
    Real GDP Growth Rate   2.6836 -0.0611    1.4539 -0.5074 
   (1.9103) (2.5881)    (1.4476) (1.9051) 
    Inflation Rate   1.0455* 1.1486**    0.7992* 1.1250***
   (0.5588) (0.5585)    (0.4235) (0.4111) 
    Current Account Balance / GDP   -2.5919** -2.4420*    -1.5224* -1.2992 
   (1.1789) (1.4294)    (0.8934) (1.0522) 
    KKM Index   -0.0715 -0.2143    -0.1656* -0.2653** 
   (0.1168) (0.1524)    (0.0885) (0.1122) 
    Bank Concentration   0.0428 -0.2925    0.1782 -0.1708 
   (0.4519) (0.4883)    (0.3425) (0.3594) 
    Foreign Ownership Share    0.7302*     0.5382* 
    (0.4094)     (0.3013) 
    State Ownership Share    0.4716     0.4192 
    (0.4313)     (0.3175) 
    Manufacturing / GDP   -1.0275 -1.2939    -1.0864 -1.0060 
   (0.8898) (1.0286)    (0.6743) (0.7571) 
    Secondary/Primary Enrollment   0.1557 0.1173    0.1203 0.0883 
   (0.4118) (0.4628)    (0.3120) (0.3407) 
Constant 0.5254*** 0.4669*** 0.5231** 0.6153***  0.2936*** 0.2481*** 0.5638*** 0.6247***
 (0.0733) (0.0908) (0.2531) (0.2295)  (0.0614) (0.0763) (0.1918) (0.1689) 
Adjusted R2 0.3258 0.3062 0.4648 0.6083  0.3651 0.3435 0.6044 0.7242 
Observations 112 112 91 81  112 112 91 81 
F(Population Density = 0 for Africa)  6.7410 6.8827 1.6814   3.0723 4.8775 0.3920 
    Corresponding p-value  0.0109 0.0109 0.2007   0.0827 0.0308 0.5341 
F(GDP Growth = 0 for Africa)   0.0014 1.5891    0.0677 1.9668 
    Corresponding p-value   0.9703 0.2133    0.7955 0.1670 
F(Inflation Rate = 0 for Africa)   0.0434 0.7371    0.1099 0.6639 
    Corresponding p-value   0.8355 0.3947    0.7414 0.4191 
F(KKM Index= 0 for Africa)   1.3037 0.0153    0.6650 0.0003 
    Corresponding p-value   0.2578 0.9021    0.4178 0.9869 
F(CA Balance / GDP = 0 for Africa)   0.4562 0.0376    0.0901 0.2285 
    Corresponding p-value   0.5018 0.8469    0.7650 0.6348 
F(Foreign Ownership = 0 for 
Africa)    0.3785     0.1141 
    Corresponding p-value    0.5412     0.7370 
 
 Notes: (* p< 0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
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Table 8: Factors that could explain the effect of population density on financial development 
(combined sample of low and middle income and African countries, excluding South Africa) 
 
 Dependent Variable: Liquid Liabilities/GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Ln(Population density)  0.096*** 0.050 0.013 -0.040*** -0.035      
 [12.083] [1.547] [0.2910] [62.300] [2.438]      
Roads / Area  0.289    0.512***     
  [1.387]    [12.633]     
% Population in    1.141**     1.222**   
Largest City   [6.326]     [6.455]   
Geographic branch     0.256***     0.215***  
    penetration    [180.65]     [29.084]  
Demographic branch     -0.013**     -0.009 
    penetration     [4.264]     [2.245] 
Observations 91 71 63 73 73 71  63 73 73 
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.58 0.54 0.40 0.39 0.54  0.56 0.42 0.41 
 
 Dependent Variable: Private Credit/GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Ln(Population density)  0.061*** -0.004 0.003 -0.060*** -0.039      
 [9.794] [0.010] [0.035] [7.866] [1.465]      
Roads / Area  0.365    0.347***     
  [2.518]    [11.906]     
% Population in    0.673*     0.695*   
Largest City   [3.373]     [3.642]   
Geographic branch     0.203***     0.141*  
    penetration    [8.142]     [3.454]  
Demographic branch     0.002     0.007 
    penetration     [0.043]     [0.618] 
Observations 91 71 63 73 73 71  63 73 73 
Adjusted R2 0.60 0.67 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.67  0.61 0.61 0.60 
 
Notes: All models estimated via OLS with White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. We use the same model specifications as those in Table 7, Columns 3 and 7.  F-statistics 
are presented in square brackets. * p< 0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Area is defined in terms of square miles. Geographic branch penetration is the number of commercial bank branches per 
sq. km as reported in CGAP (2009). Demographic branch penetration is commercial bank branches per 100,000 residents. In unreported specifications, we also included % of population in 
urban agglomerates, railroad track distance per sq. km, % arable land, and a measure of the geographic concentration of population with 0 indicating a uniform distribution and 1 indicating 
that the entire population is concentrated in a 20kmx20km cell (as used in Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Inclusion of those variables substantially reduced sample size, and none produced 
consistently significant results for both indicators of financial development, and when population density was excluded from the specification. 
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Table 9: Regressions for the combined sample of low and middle income and African countries 
(Stock market development) 
This table presents OLS regressions of stock market development, measured by market capitalization/GDP and value 
traded/GDP ratios, on a set of country-level variables including endowment (population and resources), 
macroeconomics, institutions, banking structure and other variables. We include all the low and middle income 
countries (including Africa, excluding South Africa), an African dummy variable, and interactions between each of 
our explanatory variables and the Africa dummy. White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are presented 
in the brackets below coefficients, and F-statistics are shown at the bottom of the table. 
 
 Stock Market Capitalization / GDP  Stock Market Value Traded / GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Africa -0.0328 -0.1983 -0.5767 -0.6173  -0.0422 -0.0265 -0.1866 -0.0884 
 (0.0918) (0.4874) (3.5900) (2.9654)  (0.0487) (0.2557) (2.1925) (1.9123) 
Ln(Population) 0.0057 0.0064 0.0387 0.0443  0.0261* 0.0318* 0.0508* 0.0459 
 (0.0269) (0.0304) (0.0467) (0.0470)  (0.0143) (0.0159) (0.0285) (0.0303) 
Ln(Population Density) 0.0206 0.0200 0.0211 0.0053  0.0135 0.0176 0.0006 -0.0094 
 (0.0244) (0.0291) (0.0333) (0.0329)  (0.0130) (0.0153) (0.0204) (0.0212) 
Natural Resources 0.0352 0.0373 -0.0620 -0.0929*  -0.0033 0.0013 -0.0057 -0.0273 
 (0.0359) (0.0382) (0.0489) (0.0504)  (0.0190) (0.0200) (0.0298) (0.0325) 
Offshore Center 0.5491*** 0.5528*** 0.5472** 0.4836**  0.1234 0.1282 0.1475 0.1337 
 (0.1815) (0.1892) (0.2082) (0.1987)  (0.0963) (0.0992) (0.1271) (0.1281) 
Ln(Per Capita Income) 0.0582 0.0502 0.0095 -0.0023  0.0113 0.0025 -0.0344 -0.0252 
 (0.0441) (0.0512) (0.0863) (0.0840)  (0.0234) (0.0268) (0.0527) (0.0542) 
Population * GDP Per Capita 0.0441 0.0430 -0.0151 0.0477  0.0418 0.0320 -0.0101 -0.0065 
 (0.0663) (0.0715) (0.0792) (0.0811)  (0.0352) (0.0375) (0.0484) (0.0523) 
Real GDP Growth Rate   -0.8275 -1.6812    0.8777 0.6343 
   (1.6296) (1.5755)    (0.9952) (1.0160) 
Inflation Rate   0.2372 0.0558    0.3270 0.2612 
   (0.7334) (0.7247)    (0.4479) (0.4673) 
Current Account Balance / GDP   3.3236*** 3.0319***    0.3548 0.4793 
   (1.0271) (1.0148)    (0.6273) (0.6545) 
KKM Index   0.1920* 0.2523**    0.0919 0.1151* 
   (0.1008) (0.0992)    (0.0616) (0.0640) 
Bank Concentration   0.7912*** 0.7262**    0.2064 0.2516 
   (0.2796) (0.3008)    (0.1708) (0.1940) 
Foreign Ownership Share    -0.4645**     -0.1677 
    (0.1851)     (0.1194) 
State Ownership Share    -0.4828*     -0.0471 
    (0.2532)     (0.1633) 
Manufacturing / GDP   -0.1143 -0.0886    0.4120 0.3511 
   (0.7630) (0.7304)    (0.4660) (0.4710) 
Secondary/Primary Enrollment   0.0835 0.1696    -0.0827 -0.1287 
   (0.2649) (0.2780)    (0.1618) (0.1793) 
Interactions with Africa dummy          
    Ln(Population)  0.0553 0.0097 0.0753   -0.0319 -0.0933 -0.0076 
  (0.1727) (0.3639) (0.3282)   (0.0906) (0.2222) (0.2116) 
    Ln(Population Density)  -0.0008 -0.0332 -0.0248   -0.0167 -0.0039 0.0006 
  (0.0759) (0.1649) (0.1750)   (0.0398) (0.1007) (0.1128) 
    Natural Resources  -0.1765 -1.7103 -0.6595   -0.0301 -0.8115 0.2750 
  (1.0926) (7.2182) (3.2664)   (0.5731) (4.4083) (2.1065) 
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    Ln(Per Capita Income)  0.0820 0.2528 0.2393   -0.0020 0.0927 0.0945 
  (0.2416) (0.7534) (0.7990)   (0.1267) (0.4601) (0.5153) 
    Population * GDP Per Capita  -0.7150 -1.1031 0.0000   0.0473 -0.1868 0.0000 
  (3.4657) (18.5810) .   (1.8179) (11.3478) . 
    Real GDP Growth Rate   0.0000 0.0000    0.0000 0.0000 
   . .    . . 
    Inflation Rate   0.9608 0.4940    0.0715 -0.2792 
   (6.7685) (2.5641)    (4.1336) (1.6536) 
    Current Account Balance / GDP   -3.5802 -4.1344    -0.4918 -1.1433 
   (11.1731) (5.6723)    (6.8236) (3.6580) 
    KKM Index   -0.7603 -0.3758    -0.4643 -0.0761 
   (2.6242) (0.8201)    (1.6026) (0.5289) 
    Bank Concentration   -0.0930 -0.3570    0.2197 -0.1404 
   (3.4549) (1.9570)    (2.1100) (1.2620) 
    Foreign Ownership Share    0.3817     0.0081 
    (0.9681)     (0.6243) 
    State Ownership Share    0.3136     -0.1034 
    (1.8021)     (1.1621) 
    Manufacturing / GDP   -1.5629 0.0000    -1.5862 0.0000 
   (8.3456) .    (5.0968) . 
    Secondary/Primary Enrollment   0.1799 -0.0627    0.2729 0.0840 
   (1.9500) (1.2598)    (1.1909) (0.8124) 
Constant 0.1665 0.1765 -0.2222 -0.0070  0.2936*** 0.0340 -0.1711 -0.0972 
 (0.1378) (0.1546) (0.3622) (0.3532)  (0.0614) (0.0811) (0.2212) (0.2278) 
Adjusted R2 71 71 66 65  0.3651 71 66 65 
Observations 0.1372 0.0667 0.2025 0.2735  112 0.1373 0.0058 0.0160 
F(Population Density = 0 for Africa)  0.0751 0.0056 0.0128   0.0006 0.0011 0.0064 
    Corresponding p-value  0.7850 0.9405 0.9107   0.9812 0.9732 0.9368 
F(GDP Growth = 0 for Africa)   0.2578 1.1386    0.7777 0.3898 
    Corresponding p-value   0.6144 0.2929    0.3831 0.5362 
F(Inflation Rate = 0 for Africa)   0.0317 0.0500    0.0094 0.0001 
    Corresponding p-value   0.8597 0.8244    0.9233 0.9910 
F(KKM Index= 0 for Africa)   0.0470 0.0231    0.0541 0.0055 
    Corresponding p-value   0.8295 0.8801    0.8172 0.9411 
F(CA Balance / GDP = 0 for Africa)   0.0005 0.0388    0.0004 0.0339 
    Corresponding p-value   0.9817 0.8448    0.9840 0.8550 
F(Foreign Ownership = 0 for 
Africa)    0.0077     0.0687 
    Corresponding p-value    0.9306     0.7947 
 
          Notes: (* p< 0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
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Table 10: Summary Statistics: Firm Sample based on ICS Surveys 
 
This table presents summary statistics on our firm-level sample (used in regressions in Table 11), based on World 
Banks’ Investment Climate Surveys over the past decade. Firm characteristics (all dummy variables) include size 
(small, medium, and large based on the number of employees), industry (manufacturing,, services, and others), 
exporter status and foreign ownership status. The external finance dummy equals one if a firm has access to loans 
from domestic or foreign banks, or credit card debts from these institutions, and zero otherwise; we only include 
firm observations for which data is available on whether the firm has access to all three external financing 
channels.   
 
Panel A African countries (excluding South Africa) 
  N Mean Std. Dev. Fraction of 0 
Firm Size-Small (0 or 1) 2,591 0.46 0.50 -- 
Firm Size-Medium (0 or 1) 2,591 0.30 0.46 -- 
Foreign (0 or 1) 2,591 0.25 0.43 -- 
Exporter (0 or 1) 2,591 0.18 0.38 -- 
Manufacturing (0 or 1) 2,591 0.70 0.46 -- 
Services (0 or 1) 2,591 0.17 0.37 -- 
Access to External Finance (0 or 1) 2,591 0.16 0.37 83.91% 
      
Panel B  Other Low- and Middle-income Countries (excluding Africa) 
 
Firm Size-Small (0 or 1) 30,525 0.34 0.47 -- 
Firm Size-Medium (0 or 1) 30,525 0.33 0.47 -- 
Foreign (0 or 1) 30,525 0.13 0.33 -- 
Exporter (0 or 1) 30,525 0.24 0.43 -- 
Manufacturing (0 or 1) 30,525 0.66 0.47 -- 
Services (0 or 1) 30,525 0.27 0.44 -- 
Access to External Finance (0 or 1) 30,525 0.26 0.44 73.75% 
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Table 11: Firm-Level Regressions on Firms’ Access to Bank Finance 
 
This table presents marginal effects from Probit regressions with the dependent variable equal 1 if a firm has access 
to loans from domestic or foreign banks, or credit card debts from these institutions, and zero otherwise. The 
explanatory variables include firm characteristics and a subset of country-level variables used in Table 7. We include 
firms from all the low and middle income countries (including Africa, excluding South Africa), an African dummy 
variable, and interactions between each of our explanatory variables and the Africa dummy. White’s 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are clustered at the country-level, and presented in the brackets below 
coefficients. F-statistics are shown at the bottom of the table. 
 
 Dependent Variable: External Finance Dummy  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Africa -0.056 -0.040 0.549*** -0.028  
 (0.100) (0.110) (0.170) (0.200)  
Firm Characteristics      
Small -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.129*** -0.136***  
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.014) (0.016)  
Medium -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.051*** -0.053***  
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010)  
Foreign -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.039*** -0.056***  
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011)  
Exporter 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.041*** 0.060***  
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)  
Manufacturing 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.043* 0.077***  
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.021)  
Services -0.041* -0.040* -0.037 -0.025  
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)  
Country Characteristics      
KKM Index 0.094* 0.093* 0.038 0.163**  
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.033) (0.070)  
Foreign Bank Ownership Share -0.236* -0.238** -0.108 -0.183  
 (0.121) (0.120) (0.088) (0.116)  
Ln(Per Capita Income) 0.006 0.005 -0.018 -0.008  
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.030) (0.039)  
Natural Resources -0.006 -0.005 0.013 0.136*  
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.019) (0.080)  
Ln(Population Density) 0.044** 0.044** 0.016 0.044*  
 (0.022) (0.018) (0.028) (0.024)  
Geographic Branch Penetration 0.002     
 (0.034)     
Demographic Branch Penetration  0.000    
  (0.001)    
Roads/Area   0.076**   
   (0.039)   
Railroads/Area    -0.045  
    (1.088)  
Interactions with Africa dummy      
Firm Characteristics      
Small -0.059*** -0.060*** -0.015 0.023  
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.049)  
Medium 0.005 0.005 0.052* 0.089  
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.032) (0.040)  
 55
Foreign 0.010 0.009 0.022 0.054  
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.034) (0.038)  
Exporter -0.038 -0.038 0.012 -0.010  
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.030)  
Manufacturing -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.096** -0.135***  
 (0.037) (0.039) (0.038) (0.029)  
Services -0.147*** -0.151*** -0.154*** -0.187***  
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.034) (0.030)  
Country Characteristics      
KKM Index -0.044 -0.009 0.102 -0.094  
 (0.110) (0.115) (0.086) (0.123)  
Foreign Bank Ownership Share -0.083 -0.062 -0.208* -0.251  
 (0.131) (0.133) (0.120) (0.283)  
Ln(Per Capita Income) -0.122** -0.169*** -0.012 -0.121**  
 (0.061) (0.064) (0.058) (0.059)  
Natural Resources 0.869** 0.403 -0.270** 0.535  
 (0.371) (0.247) (0.137) (0.639)  
Ln(Population Density) -0.066** -0.036 0.061 -0.061  
 (0.031) (0.029) (0.048) (0.040)  
Geographic Branch Penetration 0.363***     
 (0.104)     
Demographic Branch Penetration  0.033***    
  (0.009)    
Roads/Area   -0.404**   
   (0.198)   
Railroads/Area    0.376  
    (7.322)  
Pseudo R2 0.093 0.093 0.078 0.094  
Observations 33653 33653 31511 30699  
F(Population Density = 0 for Africa) 0.993 0.135 4.00 0.27  
    Corresponding p-value 0.319 0.713 0.05 0.61  
F(Geog. Penetration = 0 for Africa) 13.991     
    Corresponding p-value 0.000     
F(Demog. Penetration = 0 for 
Africa)  15.305    
    Corresponding p-value  0.000    
F(Roads/Area= 0 for Africa)   2.84   
    Corresponding p-value   0.09   
F(Railroads/Area = 0 for Africa)    0.00  
    Corresponding p-value    0.99  
 
Notes: (* p< 0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
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Figure 1: Liquid liabilities / GDP in African countries, actual vs. predicted values 
(Notes: Based on the specification in Table 5, Column 4, without the bank ownership variable; negative predicted 
values are replaced by zero). 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Private credit / GDP in African countries, actual vs. predicted values 
(Notes: Based on the specification in Table 5, Column 8, without the bank ownership variable; negative predicted 
values are replaced by zero.) 
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Figure 3: Relationship between population density and liquid liabilities/GDP 
Notes: Plots are for the typical African and non-African developing country based on Table 7.  Specifically, the vertical 
axis plots predicted values from Model 2 in Table 7.  For all variables other than population density, we use the mean 
value for the subsample (either Africa or other developing countries) multiplied by the appropriate coefficient for that 
subsample.  For population density, we run through the range of possible values and multiply by the appropriate 
coefficient for each subsample to generate the curvature. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Relationship between population density and private credit/GDP 
Notes: The vertical axis plots predicted values from Model 6 in Table 7.  For all variables other than population density, 
we use the mean value for the subsample (either Africa or other developing countries) multiplied by the appropriate 
coefficient for that subsample.  For population density, we run through the range of possible values and multiply by the 
appropriate coefficient for each subsample to generate the curvature. 
